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Executive Summary 
Background 
Large resource development projects take years to plan. During that planning time, the public 
frequently debates the potential benefits and risks of a project, but with incomplete information. 
In these debates, some people might assert that a project would have great benefits, while others 
might assert that it would certainly harm the environment. At the same time, the developer will 
be assessing different designs, before finally submitting one to the government permitting 
agencies for evaluation and public scrutiny.  
For large mines in Alaska, the government permitting process takes years, and often includes an 
ecological risk assessment. This assessment is a data-intensive, scientific evaluation of the 
project’s potential ecological risks, based on the specific details of the project. 
Recently, some organizations have tried to bring scientific rigor to the pre-design public 
discussions, especially for mining projects, through a pre-design risk ecological risk assessment.  
This is a scientific assessment of the environmental risks a project might pose, before the details 
of project design, risk-prevention, and risk-mitigation measures are known. 
It is important to know whether pre-design risk assessment is a viable method for drawing 
conclusions about risks of projects. If valid risk predictions can be made at that stage, then 
people or governments would not have to wait for either a design or for the detailed evaluation 
that is done during the permitting process. Such an approach could be used to short cut 
permitting. It could affect project financing; it could affect the schedule, priority, or even the 
resources that governments put toward evaluating a project. But perhaps most important: in an 
age where public perceptions are an important influence on a project’s viability and government 
permitting decisions, a realistic risk assessment can be used to focus public attention on the facts. 
But if the methodology is flawed and results in poor quality information and unsupportable 
conclusions, then a pre-design risk assessment could unjustifiably either inflame or calm the 
public, depending on what it predicts.  
Scope of the Paper 
 This paper analyzes the validity of pre-design ecological risk assessments for mining projects. It 
does so by defining some concepts about risk, summarizing the EPA’s guidelines for an 
ecological risk assessment, and discussing three ecological risk assessments for mining projects 
in Alaska: post-design risk assessments for the Kensington and Red Dog mines, and a pre-design 
assessment for the proposed Pebble mine. 
A Note about the Pebble Mine Project 
The Pebble mine project is an advanced mineral exploration project within the Bristol Bay 
watershed in southwest Alaska. Bristol Bay is also home to the world’s largest red salmon run 
and significant commercial, subsistence, and sport fisheries. The project is still in the planning 
stage, but has already caused a huge amount of public discussion, advertising, lawsuits, and 
assertions.  
Given that controversy, and because this paper analyzes a pre-design risk assessment for the 
Pebble project, it is worthwhile to emphasize what the paper is not. This paper is not a defense of 
the Pebble project, and it is not a critique of that project.  It evaluates the applicability and 
scientific value for mine projects of a pre-design ecological risk assessment. It does not examine 
or draw conclusions about whether the Pebble mine itself would be high or low risk. It only 
evaluates whether a pre-design ecological risk assessment can adequately predict project risks, 
whatever they might be. 
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Analysis and Discussion 
Overview of Ecological Risk 
The paper begins with an overview of ecological risk.  It describes how risk to the environment 
is a big part of public discussions about proposed projects.  
EPA defines risk in this context as the “chance of harmful effects to . . . ecological systems.” 
This paper defines prevention as an activity to prevent a harmful event from occurring, and 
mitigation as an activity to limit the severity of a problem once it occurs. An ecological risk 
assessment must take into account prevention and mitigation activities, or it is likely to 
misrepresent actual ecological risks. 
Ecological Risk Assessment Process 
Ecological risk assessments are done under a set of guidelines developed by the EPA and 
published in the Federal Register in 1998. The process is typically data-intensive, using specific 
information about a project and the surrounding environment to determine the risk to specific 
resources. This paper briefly summarizes that process, as well as describing the distinction 
between ecological and engineering risk and the role of the public in risk assessments. 
Examples of Post-Design Ecological Risk Assessments  
Ecological risk assessments are frequently completed during the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) process for mines in Alaska, when government permitting agencies are 
evaluating a project. During the permitting process, the project design is known, along with 
prevention and mitigation activities that the developer proposes or the government will impose 
on the project. To illustrate the process and level of detail involved in this process, this paper 
examines two post-design ecological risk assessments. 
The first example is an ecological risk assessment that was done of proposed tailings disposal for 
the planned Kensington gold mine. The assessment evaluated the risk of harm to fish and 
wildlife from the developer’s proposal to put gold mine tailings in a lake near the mine. This 
assessment was prepared during the mine’s permitting evaluation and published as part of the 
project’s supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. 
The second example is an ecological risk evaluation that targeted fugitive dust along the Red 
Dog mine road. This evaluation was done after evidence showed that dust from trucks hauling 
Red Dog ore was causing metals to accumulate along the road. The study assessed the risk that 
the metals were contaminating streams, fish, and subsistence foods. 
The discussion in the paper shows that both assessments used detailed site-specific information, 
testing, and environmental data to come to their conclusions. For example, the Kensington study 
included detailed tests of Kensington tailings on water quality and vegetation growth, as well as 
tests that documented the bioaccumulation of metals in benthic organisms taken from 
Kensington-specific tailings. The Red Dog assessment collected metal concentrations in soil, 
water, and vegetation from a variety of environments. The assessments projected potential 
contaminants, after the prevention and mitigation strategies had been applied. 
Information, environmental characteristics, and prevention and mitigation strategies change from 
mine to mine. The post-design environmental risk assessments described in this paper used 
project-specific data to come to conclusions about the risks of particular situations. This detailed 
project information, a multitude of other project-specific tests, and environmental data from the 
specific areas were necessary for the ecological risk assessments to come to credible conclusions. 
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Example of a Pre-Design Ecological Risk Assessment 
In October 2010, The Nature Conservancy published An Assessment of Ecological Risk to Wild 
Salmon Systems from Large-scale Mining in the Nushagak and Kvichak Watersheds of the 
Bristol Bay Basin. It is the first formal pre-design ecological risk assessment published for a 
project in Alaska. It attempts to scientifically assess the ecological risks of the Pebble mine 
project to Bristol Bay salmon—an indisputably important resource. It concludes that this 
assessment of risks is relevant to mines “regardless of their design” and that they would apply 
“to any large mine development in the [Bristol Bay] region.”  
 
This paper analyzes five subjects included in The Nature Conservancy’s assessment: 
• Acid rock drainage 
• Water withdrawal 
• Culvert impacts 
• Fugitive dust 
• Dam failure 
For each of these subjects, this analysis demonstrates that the Nature Conservancy’s analysts 
lacked the data needed to evaluate the specific environmental characteristics of the mine (dust, 
water use, water quality, and others), and so were forced to make unjustified and unrealistic 
assumptions about what would happen if the mine were developed. In addition, because the 
mining companies have not yet submitted a project design, the conservancy’s assessment omits 
prevention and mitigation strategies that could be used to reduce risk. 
This paper does not conclude that the Pebble Project or any other large mine in Bristol Bay will 
be high risk or low risk. It simply concludes that the pre-design assessment published by the 
Nature Conservancy lacked the data to support its analysis.  As a result, the pre-design ecological 
risk assessment came to scientifically unsupportable conclusions about the risks to salmon of a 
Pebble mine or any other large mine project in Bristol Bay. 
 
Conclusions 
Scientifically sound ecological risk assessments require a great deal of data. The post-design 
assessments analyzed in this paper used detailed data that were the result of testing done for the 
specific parameters of the Kensington mine and the Red Dog mine road. The paper makes clear 
that the specific environmental characteristics of the sites and the project-specific details were a 
necessary basis for the conclusions these studies draw. 
Every hard-rock mine is unique. The methods used to protect water quality and fish populations 
are different from mine to mine. The milling processes are engineered for individual mines and 
result in environmental outputs with different characteristics. These and other differences 
influence the ecological risk characteristics of individual mines. 
The Nature Conservancy’s pre-design ecological risk assessment lacked project-specific design 
details and used limited information to project what would happen if the mine were developed. It 
introduced bias by making unrealistic assumptions about the as-yet unknown design and by 
omitting prevention and mitigation strategies. As a result, its conclusions are not reliable. 
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In summary: 
• Post-design ecological risk assessments use detailed project-specific and site-specific 
data to come to credible conclusions. 
• Hard-rock mines are unique, and data from one mine is unlikely to represent another. 
• The pre-design ecological risk assessment reviewed in this paper used unreliable 
assumptions in the absence of actual design details, and failed to include the as-yet-
unknown prevention and mitigation strategies.  These omissions caused the pre-design 
risk assessment to come to unsupportable conclusions. 
For these reasons, this paper concludes that a pre-design ecological risk assessment is a failed 
methodology for evaluating the risks posed by hard-rock mines in Alaska. 
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Section 1.  Introduction 
Background 
Large resource development projects—such as mines, or oil and gas fields—take years to plan.   
During that time, the public debates these projects with incomplete information: Will it be 
economic? Will it harm the environment? Will the salmon be protected? What is the risk? 
Despite the public debate, the specific effects on the environment typically can’t be resolved at 
this early stage, because the public and sometimes even the project developer are unsure of the 
eventual project design. The debate continues while the project owner continues to plan and 
refine the project.  
 
In a typical situation, after the project developer comes up with a design, there is a government 
fact-finding investigationan environmental impact statement or similar analysisthat arrives 
at answers to the environmental questions. That evaluation process also often includes an 
ecological risk assessment: a data-based, scientific evaluation of the potential risks to ecosystems 
from a proposed large resource development project. The government studies a real project 
design and gathers data to answer specific questions. Sometimes government agencies require 
more data before they are satisfied. While people may disagree with the conclusions of a 
government study, for the government permitting agencies, the study provides answers based on 
accepted scientific methodologies and a great deal of project-specific data. 
 
But recently, some organizations have tried to bring scientific rigor to the public discussion 
before the developer has submitted a project design. In October 2010, The Nature Conservancy 
published an ecological risk assessment that outlined the risks to salmon of large-scale mining in 
the Bristol Bay watershed in southwest Alaska. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
appears to be completing a pre-design risk assessment of mining as part of its Scientific 
Assessment of the Bristol Bay Watershed, though the agency’s methodology is unknown as of 
late 2011. Pre-design, scientific assertions about environmental risk have been made in debates 
about other projects as well. 
 
A scientific pre-design risk assessment is an innovative approach. The 2010 ecological risk 
assessment by The Nature Conservancy is the first time in Alaska that a scientific assessment has 
been attempted before project details are available—before a mine plan, with associated risk 
prevention and risk-mitigation strategies, has been submitted.  
 
It’s important to know whether pre-design risk assessment is a viable method for drawing 
conclusions about risks of projects. If valid risk predictions can be made at that stage, then 
people or governments would not have to wait for either a design or the detailed evaluation that 
is done during the permitting process. Such an approach could be used to short cut permitting. It 
could affect project financing; it could affect the schedule, priority, or even the resources that 
governments put toward evaluating a project. But perhaps most important: in an age where 
public perceptions are an important influence on a project’s viability and government permitting 
decisions, a realistic risk assessment can be used to focus public attention on the facts. But if the 
methodology is flawed and results in poor quality information and unsupportable conclusions, 
then a pre-design risk assessment could unjustifiably either inflame or calm the public, 
depending on what it predicts. 
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Purpose of This Paper 
This paper analyzes the validity of pre-design ecological risk assessments for mining projects. It 
first defines some concepts about risk, explains why ecological risk plays such an important part 
in public debates about proposed projects, and summarizes the EPA’s guidelines for an 
ecological risk assessment. It then describes how scientific assessments of risk are carried out, 
and discusses three ecological risk assessments for mining projects in Alaska: post-design risk 
assessments for the Kensington and Red Dog mines, and The Nature Conservancy’s pre-design 
assessment for the proposed Pebble mine.  
A Note about the Pebble Mine Project 
The Pebble mine project is an advanced mineral exploration project within the Bristol Bay 
watershed in southwest Alaska. The mining company is expected to propose a large open-pit 
mine. Bristol Bay is also home to the world’s largest red salmon run and supports significant 
commercial, subsistence, and sport fisheries. The mine project is still in the planning stage, but it 
has already caused a huge amount of public discussion, advertising, lawsuits, and assertions.  
Given that controversy, and because this paper analyzes a pre-design risk assessment for the 
Pebble project, it is worthwhile to emphasize what this paper is not. It is not a defense of the 
Pebble project, and it is not a critique of that project. It evaluates the applicability and scientific 
value for mine projects of a pre-design ecological risk assessment. It does not examine or draw 
conclusions about whether the Pebble mine itself would be high or low risk. It only evaluates 
whether a pre-design ecological risk assessment can adequately predict project risks, whatever 
they might be. 
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Section 2.  Overview of Ecological Risk 
 
The Importance Of Risk In The Public Discussion 
An important part of the public discussion about large resource projects is typically about the 
ecological risks a proposed project may create. The Pebble mine project provides an excellent 
example of the importance the public places on knowing about potential risks to ecosystems.   
Much of the widespread and contentious public discussion about the project revolves around 
people’s perceptions of the risks it may pose to the environment of the Bristol Bay watershed. 
Opponents of the potential Pebble mine have focused on the risk to salmon, with some asserting 
“there is a virtual certainty” that the mine would contaminate the salmon fisheries1 and others 
saying that the mine “could” harm waters, communities, and fisheries—and that such a risk is 
not worth taking.2  
Mine proponents, not surprisingly, assess the risk differently, citing “responsible mining 
technologies” that make it possible for the fisheries and the mine to co-exist.3 Staff of the mining 
project, in conversations with the author, have said they believe a mine can be designed with 
limited risk to salmon.4 
Some observers are waiting for more information before drawing conclusions about the project. 
In observing the dispute for the last five years, the author has seen that different people look at 
the project and come to different conclusions about how risky it will be to salmon. Part of that 
difference may be due to differences in how much risk people are willing to accept. But part may 
also be due to a factual dispute about the size of the risk.  
The controversy over the proposed Pebble mine is currently the highest-profile public debate 
about a proposed Alaska resource development project, but there are other examples of similar 
controversies about other large development projects. Certainly, some elements of the debate 
about the risks of the proposed Pebble mine have been part of public discussions about most 
large mine projects in Alaska. 
Conceptual Discussion of Ecological Risk 
To understand the process of ecological risk assessment, it is important to understand the basic 
concepts of “ecological risk.” 
What is Risk?  
There are many definitions of risk. For scientific assessments of ecological risk, EPA defines risk 
as “chance of harmful effects to . . . ecological systems.”5 A systematic, scientific process will 
try to define both the “chance” and the “harm.”  It should describe the likelihood of harm, and 
precisely describe what harm is being evaluated.  
What is the Role of Prevention and Mitigation? 
Prevention and mitigation are useful concepts for the discussion of risk. Some activities that 
companies or governments use to address risk are aimed at preventing a problem, and some 
activities are intended to contain the severity of a problem after it has occurred. For example, 
drivers can help prevent a car crash (the problem) by maintaining their cars in good working 
                                                 
1 Web page for Wild Salmon Protection, Inc.; www.wildsalmonprotection.com; 7/14/11. 
2 Brian Kraft, quoted in the newsletter for the Alaska Center for the Environment.  Center News, Winter 2004. 
3 Web page for The Pebble Partnership; http://www.pebblepartnership.com/; 7/14/11. 
4 Numerous personal conversations with the author over the last five years.  
5 EPA Risk Assessment website: http://epa.gov/riskassessment/basicinformation.htm#arisk; 10/21/11. 
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order, keeping the tires inflated, and driving the speed limit. But if a crash happens anyway, 
airbags and seatbelts can mitigate the severity of the crash.  
 
In the real world of mine regulation, some activities have the characteristics of both prevention 
and mitigation—both helping prevent a problem and limiting its effects. For example, an 
intensive inspection regime may help keep an oil storage facility working properly to prevent 
leaks, and it may also detect leaks early, to limit their effects. 
  
An Example: Prevention and Mitigation Strategies in a Risk Assessment 
An example will illustrate how prevention and mitigation strategies affect an ecological risk 
assessment. A hypothetical Alaska village sits on the bank of a river; fuel and supplies are 
transported to the village via the river, but the river is also an important source of subsistence 
fish. The village decides it needs to store fuel to supply generators for electricity, because fuel 
can only be delivered during the few months when the river is ice-free.  
 
Thirty years ago, the village might have installed a single-walled fuel tank right on the bank of 
the river. Single-walled fuel tanks have a high incidence of leaking. If there were a 1% chance of 
a significant leak each year, then over 30 years there would be more than a 25% chance that a 
significant leak would pollute the river. This is a high-risk situation. 
 
Fortunately, over the last 30 years, society has developed many strategies to prevent fuel spills, 
including: 
• Replace the single-walled tank with a double-walled tank. 
• Include containment of 110% of the tank’s capacity, so that even if the entire tank leaks, 
the fuel is captured rather than getting into the environment. 
• Establish a rigorous inspection system and operational procedures to minimize spills. 
Figure 1 illustrates how these prevention strategies 
reduce the risk of a spill in our example.  The figure 
shows risk on a vertical axis—high risk at the top and 
zero risk at the bottom. The base case—a single-
walled fuel tank filled adjacent to a river—is high 
risk. A 25% chance of spilling fuel into the river over 
the life of the tank is a high risk. As successive 
prevention strategies are introduced, the risk goes 
down. A double-walled tank, inside containment and 
monitored with a rigorous inspection program, is not 
zero risk—but the risk of a significant fuel spill is 
greatly reduced.  
Besides taking measures to lower the risk of a fuel 
spill, a project developer may propose or the 
government may also require mitigation measures to 
limit the severity of a spill, if it happens, including: 
• Move the fuel tank back one-half mile from 
the river. 
• Have oil spill response equipment on site to clean up fuel as soon as it spills, before it can 
travel to the water. 
• Establish a rigorous inspection system so that spills are identified right away, before they 
get worse or migrate to the river. 
Figure 1.  Effect of Risk Prevention 
Strategies 
  
   Page 9 
Figure 2 shows how mitigation measures might work in our example. The horizontal axis 
outlines the severity of the effects, worsening from the left to the right. Depending on the size of 
the spill, the slope of the ground, and other factors, moving the tank away from the river might 
mean no oil would go directly into the river. Having spill response equipment on-site might 
mean the spill could be cleaned up on the ground, before it has a chance to reach the river. 
Similarly, an inspection program could identify a leak while much of the oil was still in the tank. 
An oil spill occurring on the banks of a river is likely to be very harmful to the river water 
quality and fish habitat. But mitigation measures can sharply reduce those effects.  
Figure 2. Effects of Risk Mitigation Strategies 
 
Together, prevention and mitigation can transform a situation with high risk and severe 
consequences to a low risk of much lesser consequences. Figure 3 shows their combined effects. 
 
Figure 3. Effects of Risk Prevention and Mitigation Strategies 
 
The conceptual example explained above provides the framework for understanding one of the 
difficulties with constructing a pre-design ecological risk assessment: a pre-design, pre-
permitting risk assessment can’t include prevention and mitigation strategies that aren’t known 
until there is a specific project design.  
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Section 3.  Ecological Risk Assessment Methodology 
 
The Ecological Risk Assessment Process 
What is an Ecological Risk Assessment?  
EPA developed the concept of ecological risk assessment in the 1990s, through a series of 
forums and workshops. In 1998, the agency published a set of guidelines for ecological risk 
assessment in the Federal Register.  While there have been many scholarly articles written about 
ecological risk assessments since then, the EPA guidelines still define the process.  
 
The EPA defines an ecological risk assessment as “The process that evaluates the likelihood that 
adverse ecological effects may occur as a result of exposure to one or more stressors.” A stressor 
is “any physical, chemical, or biological entity that can induce an adverse response.”6 To make 
the risk assessment more valuable, it specifies what harm is being risked or what needs to be 
protected. For example, the phrase, “There is a very high risk to salmon” is a scientifically 
ambiguous statement. It could mean a 10-foot reach of salmon habitat might be degraded, or it 
could mean there is a threat to the entire population in a watershed. For that reason, risk 
assessments evaluate the risk to a specific endpoint—which the EPA defines as “an explicit 
expression of the environmental value to be protected.”  
 
The Ecological Risk Assessment Process 
EPA’s guidelines for ecological risk assessment define a three-phase process: problem 
formulation, analysis, and risk characterization.  While a complete description of EPA guidance 
is beyond this review, the stages are generally as summarized below. 
 
• Problem Formulation. At this stage the analyst determines what elements in the 
ecosystem are at risk and need to be evaluated. The risk assessment will pick specific 
endpoints—that is, ecological conditions for which the risk assessment will define the 
risk. As noted above, EPA defines an assessment endpoint as “an explicit expression of 
the environmental value to be protected.” For example, salmon are valued ecological 
entities; reproduction and age class structure are some of their important attributes.  
Together, “salmon reproduction and age class structure form an assessment endpoint.”7 If 
an assessment included this endpoint, it would assess the risk that a project would 
decrease reproduction or disrupt the age class structure of salmon in particular streams or 
stream reaches. 
 
• Analysis. At this stage, the risk assessment looks at the stressors—that is, the chemical or 
physical changes that a project would cause. The assessment comes up with a plan for 
analyzing the various pathways by which the physical and chemical changes could affect 
the endpoint, and then determines a plan for analyzing the effects. This phase is 
frequently the data-intensive part of the assessment.  EPA guidelines are quite clear: 
“Even though the risk assessment focuses on data analysis and interpretation, acquiring 
the appropriate quantity and quality of data for use in the process is critical. If the data are 
unavailable, the risk assessment may stop until the data are obtained.”8 All of EPA’s 
                                                 
6 U.S. EPA.  Framework for Ecological Risk Assessment.  February 1992.  Section 5. Key Terms, Page 37 and 38. 
7 U.S. EPA.  Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment.  April 1998.  Appendix B.  Key Terms, page B-1. 
8 Ibid, p. 7. 
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diagrams of the risk assessment process include a box off to the side of the diagram that 
reads, approximately, “As necessary, acquire new data.” 
In most kinds of analyses, scientists tend to want more data. But the EPA’s guidelines 
have a clear implication for risk assessments: if the data are not good enough to allow 
analysts to come to a defensible conclusion, then they must gather more data or stop the 
analysis. Because of the wide range of ecological risk assessments, EPA’s guidance does 
not specify a particular detail or type of data that must be available. Decisions about what 
is necessary are left to the discretion of those doing a specific assessment. 
 
• Risk Characterization. This last phase provides the conclusions about risk.  Here analysts 
use information from the previous phases to estimate the risk to the assessment endpoints. 
For example, “there is little risk (or great risk) to salmon reproduction in this stretch of 
stream” would be a risk characterization. Analyst must also indicate their overall degree 
of confidence in the risk estimates—and, of course, must provide the chain of logic and 
data by which they came to their conclusions. 
 
Engineering Risk versus Ecological Risk 
Ecological risk assessments typically use, as a starting point for analysis, inputs that define the 
expected chemical and physical changes—in EPA terms, stressors—from a proposed project. 
Those inputs come from engineering evaluations. For example, an engineering evaluation might 
say that a proposed mine would have a discharge with a certain concentration of dissolved 
metals. The ecological risk assessment would take that concentration as a given and evaluate the 
ecological risk of a discharge with that concentration; the metal concentration in the water would 
be the chemical stressor to the system. Another example would be a mine evaluated as using a 
certain volume of water and not returning it to the ecosystem. The risk assessment would take 
that water loss as a given physical stressor and trace the ecological risk to the system from that 
amount of water loss. 
 
But what about the risk that the mine won’t meet its projected physical and chemical 
parameters—that is, the project doesn’t perform as expected? These are engineering risks—the 
risk that a building will fall down, that a dam will fail, or that a water treatment plant will not 
produce water with the predicted quality. 
 
Engineering risk evaluation is an iterative process (as is ecological risk assessment, to a certain 
extent). For example, government agencies cannot grant a permit for water discharge from a 
mine until they are convinced the discharge will meet permit standards; a company must prove to 
the agencies’ satisfaction that the proposed system will meet standards. During the design and 
permitting stages, all proposed mine processes may be designed and re-designed until they meet 
permit standards. Only after the agencies are convinced that the project design is adequate to 
actually meet the standards may the permitting process continue. Agencies will not proceed with 
an EIS for a project they believe cannot meet permit standards. There are numerous examples of 
permitting processes and even EIS processes being stopped until projects were re-designed to the 
point where the agencies believed they would meet permit standards9.  
                                                 
9 One example is the permitting process for the Pogo mine southeast of Fairbanks, which was stopped for an entire 
year while the company re-designed the facilities to meet EPA standards for volume of water discharge. The 
company moved all the facilities from the top of the ridge between Liese and Pogo creeks to a new location in the 
Liese Creek Valley to meet EPA requirements. Once calculations showed the new location would work for those 
standards, the process resumed. 
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To some extent, the ecological risk assessment process works that way as well. If the ecological 
risk analysis shows that a protected environmental value—an endpoint—could be unacceptably 
compromised, and an agency has the authority to deny a permit, the project would either stop or 
be redesigned. 
 
In evaluating an ecological risk assessment, it is important to keep in mind the distinction 
between ecological and engineering risk. Put another way, if the engineering evaluation is 
wrong, then the inputs to the ecological assessment may be wrong: if the dam fails or the 
building falls down, then the conclusions of the ecological risk assessment may be undermined 
as well.10 
 
Role of the Public in Ecological Risk Assessment 
So far the discussion about ecological risk assessment has described it as an entirely technical 
process—science without the public having much of a say. But the public does have a number of 
opportunities to take part in the process. First, the assessment endpoints included in the risk 
assessment should represent an important benchmark to the public—and a level of change 
acceptable to the public. Imagine, for example, an assessment endpoint that is “maintain 95% of 
current or potential spawning habitat.” In some places around the country, the public might see 
an endpoint of 95% as too low; in other places, the public might consider it too high.  Similarly, 
there might be public discussions about whether the endpoint should include potential spawning 
habitat as well as current spawning habitat. 
 
Second, the public can review the science behind the ecological risk assessment. Typically, 
interest groups hire scientists to review risk assessments, but individual members of the public 
may of course also review assessments. 
 
Finally, for those permits where an agency has the discretion to balance the risk to public 
resources against the applicant’s rights, the public may weigh in—using information from the 
risk assessment—to advise the agency whether the risk is acceptable and whether the permit 
should be granted or denied. 
 
                                                 
10 As an example of the difference between engineering and ecological risk assessment, the Lake and Peninsula 
Borough, in a letter (9/25/06) to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, asked that the agency perform “A risk 
assessment concerning the failure of actual water quality at closure to meet predicted water quality.” That would be 
a request for an engineering risk assessment. An ecological risk assessment would take the water quality predicted in 
the engineering assessment as an input to trace the risk to important ecological resources.  
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Section 4. Examples of Post-Design Ecological Risk Assessments 
 
Ecological risk assessments are frequently completed during the EIS process for mines in 
Alaska.11 During the permitting and EIS processes, the specific details of the proposed project 
are known; government agencies will have forced the applicant to revise the engineering analysis 
so discharges and emissions appear to meet permit standards without undue risk of failure. A risk 
assessment conducted at this post-design phase can also take into account the prevention and 
mitigation strategies the applicant proposes or that governments will impose on the mine. 
 
That last point—what government agencies will impose—is important. For example, if an 
ecological risk assessment analyzes water loss from mine operations, it matters how the 
authorizing permit is written. For example, taking water from a fish stream may pose risks to the 
fish, and presumably that risk would be greater during a drought, when the streamflow is lower. 
If the permit is written so the mine simply receives the right to a certain volume of water, then 
the ecosystem will bear the ecological risk of having too little water during a drought. But if the 
permit instead requires the mine to leave a certain flow in the stream, then the mine rather than 
the ecosystem will bear the risk of drought. 
 
An ecological risk assessment is a data-intensive process. An assessment undertaken during the 
permitting phase gives government agencies the ability to gather critical data or to compel the 
applicant to gather that data. Two examples below show the importance of having the inputs to a 
risk assessment be well defined, and of having detailed project- and site-specific data.  
  
Aqueous Tailings Disposal at the Kensington Gold Mine 
The Kensington gold mine operates in an area of historic gold mining, 45 air miles north of 
Juneau, in southeast Alaska. Permits for the mine were issued in 2005, but litigation held up 
construction until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on legal challenges in 2009. The mine developer 
proposed to place tailings in Lower Slate Lake. There are salmon downstream in Slate Creek, but 
a barrier downstream of Lower Slate Lake prevents salmon from reaching the lake. The lake has 
Dolly Varden char, which is a game fish in Alaska, and three-spine sticklebacks are also known 
to be in the lake.12   
 
The permitting process for this mine included an ecological risk assessment to determine risks 
caused by the proposed disposal of tailings. That assessment was included as Appendix C of the 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, evaluating the risks during both mining and 
reclamation.I It looked at whether there was risk during mining when tailings would be placed in 
the lake, and whether there was risk for the long term, after the mine closed.  
 
                                                 
11 See for example, Appendix C, Kensington Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Ecological Risk 
Assessment of Aqueous Tailings Disposal at the Kensington Gold Mine, December 2004. Also, Red Dog Mine 
Closure and Reclamation Plan: Evaluation of Ecological Risk within the Ambient Air/Solid Waste Permit Boundary 
(Exponent, 2008). Also, Draft Mine-Area Ecological Risk Evaluation, Prepared In Support of Red Dog Mine 
Closure Plan Development (Exponent, 2007).   
12 Appendix C, Kensington Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Ecological Risk Assessment of 
Aqueous Tailings Disposal at the Kensington Gold Mine.  Tetra Tech, Inc. December 2004. P. C-12. 
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Phase 1. Problem Formulation: Picking Assessment Endpoints 
Based on EPA’s ecological risk assessment guidance, the first step in the process was problem 
formulation: picking risk assessment endpoints around which to structure the analysis. The 
analysts picked five primary endpoints and one secondary endpoint, summarized below.13 These 
reflect a relatively comprehensive set of endpoints for protection of fish, waterfowl, wildlife, and 
their predators—all of which are important to the public. 
 
• Dolly Varden char. Re-establish or enhance a viable Dolly Varden char fishery in Lower 
Slate Lake at the end of mining. For this endpoint, the analysts needed to review the various 
conditions required for the survival, growth, and reproduction of Dolly Varden char. Part of 
the thinking behind this endpoint was that the fish might not survive when the Kensington 
developer was actually placing tailings in the lake. If they did not survive, the developer 
proposed to re-establish the fishery after the mine closed. 
 
• Secondary Endpoint—Dolly Varden char. Protect Dolly Varden char during operation of the 
tailings facility.  This endpoint includes protecting the survival, growth, and reproduction of 
the char, as well as the vegetation, macro invertebrates, and the three-spine sticklebacks 
necessary for the survival of the char.  
 
• Waterfowl. Protect waterfowl during tailings operations and after the mine closes from lethal, 
mutagenic, reproductive systematic, or general toxic effects due to ingestion of metals in the 
lake water, or from benthic organisms or vegetation that had absorbed metals.  
 
• Terrestrial herbivores (for example, deer or moose). Protect terrestrial herbivores during 
tailings operation and after the mine closes from lethal, mutagenic, reproductive systematic, 
or general toxic effects due to ingestion of chemicals from the water and in vegetation along 
the margins of the lake.  
 
• Terrestrial omnivores (for example, black bears). Protect terrestrial omnivores during tailings 
operation and after the mine closes from lethal, mutagenic, reproductive systematic, or 
general toxic effects due to ingestion of chemicals in water and food affected by the tailings 
facility. 
 
• Higher-order predators (for example, wolves, river otters, and bald eagles).  Protect higher-
order mammalian and avian consumers (e.g., predators) during tailings operation and after 
the mine closes from ingesting water and contaminated prey that might result in lethal, 
mutagenic, reproductive, systematic, or general toxic effects due to metal concentration. 
 
 
Phase 2.  Analysis  
The analysis for risk assessments start with the physical and chemical changes in the ecosystem 
the project could cause—in the language of the EPA, the stressors. The most important inputs for 
the Kensington analysis were the chemical characteristics of the mine discharge. It was critical to 
know the metal concentrations and pH in the water and tailings that the Kensington developer 
proposed to place in the lake. It was also important to know the volume of tailings and water 
discharged by the mine. 
                                                 
13 The assessment analysts actually picked a management goal for each endpoint, and then a more scientific 
assessment endpoint that is a proxy for the management goal. For brevity, the two are summarized together. 
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The analysts took these stressors and began a screening process to determine which had potential 
to significantly harm the fish and wildlife specified in the assessment endpoints. To assess the 
potential ecological concerns, the screening process used a combination of project-specific 
testing, site characteristics, and national studies. Project-specific tests included measuring metal 
concentrations and pH in Kensington test-tailings created from ore samples, and measuring the 
bioaccumulation of metals from synthetic Kensington tailings in macro invertebrates. The 
analysts also looked at site-specific characteristics, such as water quality of the lake.  
 
Based on this screening process, the analysts selected four chemicals for further analysis: 
aluminum, chromium, pH, and Total Suspended Solids. They then calculated the cumulative 
exposure fish and wildlife could have, through any of a complicated set of pathways, as shown in 
Figure 4. For example, eagles or hawks could be exposed to the metals of concern by eating 
waterfowl. Waterfowl could be exposed by eating vegetation on the lake margin, benthic 
organisms, or aquatic vegetation (like algae); by direct contact with lake water and sediment; and 
by eating fish in the lake.   
 
The assessment looked at each link to see how metals would be passed through the ecosystem. It 
looked at the likely accumulation in the fish themselves, based on their exposure to lake water, 
bottom sediment, and suspended sediment. It calculated the cumulative exposure and compared 
that to various criteria for toxicity. 
 
Figure 4.  Exposure Pathways and Receptors 
 
Source: Figure 2.2, Conceptual Site Model of Exposure Pathways and Receptors.  Kensington SFEIS, Appendix C.  
Ecological Risk Assessment of Aqueous Tailings Disposal at the Kensington Gold Mine. December 2004; p. C-18. 
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Phase 3. Risk Characterization  
Risk characterization is the final phase in ecological risk assessment, comparing the results of the 
analysis for the endpoints and drawing conclusions about risk and the level of uncertainty in the 
conclusions for both physical and chemical stressors. For the Kensington mine assessment, the 
physical stressors were the total suspended solids and the deposition of tailings (sedimentation), 
and the chemical stressors were the metal concentrations and pH in the tailings and water. 
 
For the proposed deposit of tailings in Lower Slate Lake, the ecological risk assessment included 
a detailed analysis for each of the endpoints listed earlier. In general, the assessment concluded 
that during mine operations “there is significant uncertainty whether the [tailings facility] would 
support fish population during operations.” But it concluded that after reclamation the lake 
“should eventually provide better long-term conditions for Dolly Varden char than the current 
conditions in [Lower Slate Lake], although data show this level of recovery could require more 
than 50 years.”  Overall, it concluded that in general the risk to other species (other endpoints) 
was low.  
 
Conclusion: Project-Specific Data Requirements for Kensington Tailings Disposal 
The ecological risk assessment for disposal of tailings at the Kensington Gold Mine provides an 
excellent example of data requirements for a risk assessment. Much of the data that is important 
to a risk assessment is project-specific and cannot be known in detail until a developer has 
submitted a project design. 
 
Project-Specific Input for the Ecological Risk Assessment 
• The most important inputs for the Kensington tailings assessment were the geochemical 
characteristics of the tailings and water discharge into Lower Slate Lake (i.e., the metal 
concentrations and pH). The Kensington mine uses a floatation process to extract the gold 
from the ore. The metal concentrations and pH in a floatation process discharge differ 
between mines, depending on the chemistry of the ore and how the mine engineers the 
processing. The process will also differ depending on the gold recovery objectives and 
what other metals the company includes in the ore concentrate. Some metals, like zinc, 
add to the ore’s value, while others subtract from what a smelter is willing to pay for the 
concentrate. Different floatation processes have different objectives, different costs, and 
remove more or less of the gold or other metals and result in discharges with different 
characteristics. The floatation process for Kensington was engineered for the specific 
geochemical circumstances of the Kensington ore—and for the company’s economic 
objectives. 
To engineer the process for Kensington, the mining company ground up small 
representative ore samples and ran them through small-scale versions of the process they 
would use. It then tested the discard—the tailings and the water—to determine the 
chemical characteristics of each. The government permitting agencies scrutinized the 
results of the tests.  After the agencies agreed that the tests represented a reasonable 
proxy for the discharge from the actual mine, the ecological risk analysts used these 
tailings/water characteristics as the input to the assessment.14 
 
                                                 
14 The agencies’ determination of the most representative discharge was the result of detailed review and iterations 
of mine design. It was included as Attachment A of the EIS for the mine for public review.  The ecological risk 
assessment used these inputs, and noted “the decant water generally represents the worst-case water for the lake…” 
and explained the reasons. P. C-27 ibid. 
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• Other project-specific data important as input to the analysis included the project’s 
throughput and water budget. This information determined the flow rate of tailings and 
water that would be put into the lake and withdrawn from the lake for processing. 
 
Site-Specific Information Gathered for the Ecological Risk Assessment 
• Physical characteristics of Lower Slate Lake. The assessment looked at the natural metal 
concentrations and pH, and then calculated what the resulting concentration would be 
after the Kensington discharge and mixing. These post-mixing metals’ concentrations 
depended on the tailings flow rate, but also on the bathymetry and natural flow rate into 
Lower Slate Lake, on pre-mining water quality, and on pre-mining metal concentrations 
of the lake sediment.  This information was important because it defined how the project 
would change Lower Slate Lake. 
 
• Fish and wildlife characteristics of Lower Slate Lake.  These characteristics included the 
location and extent of Dolly Varden char spawning habitat, light penetration 
characteristics of the lake, fish populations and use, benthic inveterate populations, 
wildlife use, and other characteristics. All this was needed so analysts could define the 
pathways in Figure 4 above, and to calculate how the metal concentrations moved 
through the pathways. 
 
• Vegetation colonization potential of the tailings. Analysts conducted habitability tests on 
Kensington mine tailings, using marine organisms and freshwater organisms. They 
compared the results of the tailings studies with those conducted on natural sediments, to 
show whether and how fast vegetation and benthic organizations would naturally re-
colonize the tailings. 
 
• Bioaccumulation test.  Scientists did specific work in 1999 to test the bioaccumulation in 
benthic organisms of metals in Kensington tailings. Benthic organisms are critical, 
because they are the foundation for the food chain.   
 
The results of the Kensington tailings risk assessment—and confidence in those results—
depended on this project-specific and site-specific information. 
 
 
Assessment of Red Dog Road Fugitive Dust Risk 
The best-known ecological risk assessment in Alaska was done for the Red Dog mine road, 
which runs 52 miles from the Red Dog lead-zinc mine to a port on the Bering Sea.  The Red Dog 
mine trucks its concentrate down the road from the mine to the port, and from 1989 (when the 
mine opened) until 2001 the haul trucks were uncovered. As a result, metal-laden dust 
accumulated along the road. In 2001, the National Park Service published a study that found a 
high level of metal concentrations in tundra along the road.  After the report was published, the 
public became very concerned about the consequences of those metals for people and the 
environment. In particular, residents of the nearby villages of Kivalina and Noatak worried about 
the health of the fish and wildlife exposed to the dust, and about whether people were receiving 
unhealthy doses of heavy metals from eating contaminated subsistence foods. 
 
Responding to those concerns, the Environmental Public Health Program of the Alaska 
Department of Health and Social Services got involved in testing subsistence foods, and the 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation also investigated the issue. Teck Cominco, 
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the mine operator, contracted for both a human health risk assessment and an ecological risk 
assessment. The contractor’s report was completed under the jurisdiction of and was reviewed by 
the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.  
 
The final report, DMTS Fugitive Dust Risk Assessment, prepared by Exponent, was published in 
2007. (The Red Dog mine road is officially known by the somewhat awkward name of Delong 
Mountain Transportation System, or DMTS.) Consistent with EPA guidelines, analysts looking 
at the effects of fugitive dust from the Red Dog mine went through a similar set of processes and 
steps as described earlier for the assessment of Kensington mine tailings disposal: problem 
formulation, analysis, and risk characterization.  
 
The assessment of fugitive dust did differ from the Kensington example, because it was an 
assessment of a mine facility already operating, rather than just planned. In that case, scientists 
could go out and look at existing site-specific data, rather than having to rely on tests and models 
derived from site-specific data.  But the fugitive dust assessment still required a large amount of 
information that would have been difficult or impossible to formulate before detailed design 
information was known.  
 
New Information Collected 
Based on sampling and screening, the ecological risk analysts looked at the risk from fourteen 
metals: aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, lead, mercury, 
molybdenum, selenium, thallium, vanadium, and zinc.15  Although there was a significant 
amount of information already available, analysts collected a significant amount more for the 
risk assessment.   
 
The fact sheet from the assessment describes information gathered: “Data were collected in the 
marine lagoon, stream, pond, and tundra environments surrounding the port, road, and mine. 
Some data were collected for use in the human health risk assessment, some were collected for 
use in the ecological risk assessment, and some were collected for use in both. Samples of soil, 
water sediment, and plant and animal tissues were collected from these environments and 
analyzed to determine metal concentrations. The foods eaten by the representative receptors were 
identified so that samples of those foods could also be collected to determine metal 
concentrations. Thus sampling included moss, lichen, willow, birch, sedge grasses, insects in 
land and water environments and shrews and voles.” Fish tissue samples were collected as well. 
 
The fact sheet goes on to summarize information gathered “to evaluate the health of plant and 
insect communities. Plant communities were evaluated in land (terrestrial) and water (aquatic) 
environments, including coastal plain and tundra, hill slope, stream and pond, and coastal lagoon 
communities. These plant communities were studied to determine whether there were any effects 
on community structure (for example, species diversity and abundance) and health of species 
within the communities at different distances from the port, road, and mine. Insect communities 
were evaluated in streams and lagoons. Samples of the aquatic insect communities were 
collected from streams to determine their diversity and abundance in comparison to similar 
                                                 
15 Factsheet: Risk Assessment of Metals in Dust from Red Dog; prepared by Exponent® for Teck Cominco Alaska 
Incorporated, November 2007. Page 7.  Available on the DEC website: 
http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/reddog.htm (10/25/11). 
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streams offsite. Sediment (bottom mud) samples from lagoons were collected for laboratory 
testing with insects to determine if sediment could affect health of lagoon insects.”16 
 
The Public’s Role in Red Dog Assessment 
This risk assessment was unusual in that it was prompted, in part, by concerns of the residents of 
Noatak and Kivalina—and as a result the public engagement was more extensive than usual.   
• 2001. Initial site characterization began and initial contacts were made with villages and 
interest groups. 
• 2002.  A background document was prepared that included a preliminary conceptual site 
model—that is, a model explaining pathways by which contaminated soils or vegetation 
could harm fish, wildlife, and people, similar to the one shown in Figure 4. That model 
was important because it provided the framework to show what data were needed. The 
model was discussed during public meetings in Kivalina and Noatak. 
• 2003.  Village meetings were held to review and discuss the work plan to gather data for 
the risk assessment.   
• 2005.  A draft risk assessment was distributed and public comments were requested. 
• 2007.  A final risk assessment, incorporating public comments, was published.  
 
Ecological risk assessments done as part of an Environmental Impact Statement typically receive 
little attention during the public scoping process. A draft assessment is distributed with the draft 
EIS for public comment, and then the final EIS is published. The public had more opportunities 
to comment on the Red Dog road fugitive dust assessment, and because it was not a part of a 
larger issue, like mine permitting, it received more in-depth attention from the villagers and from 
some interest groups. A goal of the study was to instill public trust in its conclusions, so analysts 
provided the public with more up-front discussion than usually occurs.   
 
Conclusions of the Red Dog Road Risk Assessment 
One of the most important conclusions of the human health portion of the assessment was that “It 
is safe to continue harvesting subsistence foods in all areas without restrictions.” Conclusions 
specific to the ecological risk assessment included: 
• In most cases, the potential for harmful effects to occur in the environments surrounding 
the road, port, and mine were considered to be low. 
• No harmful effects were observed or predicted in the marine, coastal lagoon, freshwater 
stream, and tundra pond environments, though the potential for effects to invertebrates 
and plants could not be ruled out for some small, shallow ponds found close to facilities 
within the port site. However, no effects were observed in these port site ponds during 
field sampling. 
• The likelihood of risk to populations of animals was considered low, with the exception 
that risks related to lead were predicted for ptarmigan living closest to the port and mine, 
which may affect ptarmigan populations in those localized areas.17 
  
An important factor that increased the credibility of this risk assessment was that analysts were 
able to use actual, detailed data from the site, rather than having to rely models and scientific 
conjecture from other studies. 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p. 9. 
17 Ibid, p. 12-13. 
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Section 4. Pre-Design Ecological Risk Assessment:  
Risks of Large Scale Mining in the Bristol Bay Watershed 
 
Background 
In October 2010, The Nature Conservancy published An Assessment of Ecological Risk to Wild 
Salmon Systems from Large-scale Mining in the Nushagak and Kvichak Watersheds of the 
Bristol Bay Basin. The conservancy said its purpose was “to analyze and portray the potential 
risks to globally significant salmon resources of the Nushagak-Mulchatna, and Kvichak river 
drainages (proximal headwater areas) as a result of large-scale mining and associated 
facilities.”18  
 
The document attempts to scientifically assess the ecological risks of the Pebble mine project to 
Bristol Bay salmon. It is the first ecological risk assessment published for a project in Alaska 
before the developers have submitted a project design.  
 
The Pebble project is an advanced mineral exploration site on state-owned land within the Bristol 
Bay watershed in southwest Alaska.  It is exploring the potential to develop a major deposit of 
copper, gold, and molybdenum.  The mining company is expected to propose a large open-pit 
mine in the area. But Bristol Bay is also home to the world’s largest red salmon run and supports 
important commercial, subsistence, and sport fisheries.  
 
Previous sections of this report have described the detailed site-specific design and 
environmental information analysts use to reach conclusions about ecological risk—after the 
developer has proposed a mine design and when government agencies are evaluating the plan 
and deciding whether to issues permits. This section of the paper looks at The Nature 
Conservancy’s pre-design ecological assessment, to evaluate whether such an early assessment 
can make credible scientific conclusions about risk from proposed mining projects. We look in 
detail at five ecological issues covered in the conservancy’s assessment: 
• Acid rock drainage 
• Water withdrawal 
• Culvert impacts 
• Fugitive dust 
• Dam failure 
 
We chose to look at The Nature Conservancy’s coverage of acid rock drainage and water 
withdrawal because preventing water impacts on nearby streams is typically the most important 
issue for mine permitting. We look at the coverage of culvert installation because it provides a 
good opportunity to evaluate how omitting mitigation and prevention strategies affects the 
findings. Fugitive dust is, like acid rock drainage, another chemical issue affecting water quality.  
Finally, we examine the assessment’s coverage of potential dam failure because that issue 
appears to have captured the imagination and fears of at least some of the public.  
                                                 
18 Page 1. 
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Basis for Nature Conservancy’s Assessment 
In 2006, Northern Dynasty Minerals Limited, a junior mining company, applied to the Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources for water rights for the planned Pebble mine. The department’s 
regulations require that when water withdrawal would involve a dam, an application to construct 
the dam be included as well. Thus, Northern Dynasty’s water rights application included an 
application to construct dams, as well as a conceptual mine design. The water rights and dam 
applications received a date stamp and nothing more from the department, which suspended 
processing pending a full mine application and the start of the Environmental Impact Statement 
process. The 2006 conceptual design included only limited information about water use and dam 
construction, and it was one of the many alternatives then being considered for the Pebble 
project.19   
In 2007, Anglo-American PLC—an international mining company—purchased 50% of the 
Pebble project and formed Pebble Limited Partnership, a 50:50 partnership between a subsidiary 
of Anglo-American and Northern Dynasty Minerals. The new partnership announced soon 
thereafter that it was no longer actively considering the 2006 design. It has not announced a 
reason, though presumably economic and environmental feasibility considerations played a part.  
In informal conversations with the author over the past few years, partnership employees have 
indicated the company is considering multiple alternatives for a design, but is no longer 
considering the 2006 alternative.20   
To analyze and portray the risks of the Pebble project, The Nature Conservancy used the 
obsolete 2006 conceptual design. Although the developers were no long considering that design, 
in 2010 it was the only publicly available conceptual design for the project. 21  The 2006 design 
lacked detail, including most of the prevention and mitigation strategies that developers would 
include—and government would require—of a mine.  
The conservancy’s assessment acknowledges that “no comprehensive mine management plan 
(MMP) for mining in this area has been submitted for permitting or released to the public. 
Generally, a MMP is developed prior to mining commencement and includes identification and 
description of mining activities, particulars of the implementation of the management systems to 
address environmental issues; a plan and costing of closure activities . . . and other information 
as required.”22 
                                                 
19 From author’s conversations with Pebble employees, the alternative was labeled MDC (mine design concept) 25, 
the implication being that there were at least 24 other concepts. Since 2006, the company has also considered other 
alternatives and designs. 
20 Some people believe that the 2006 water rights application was not necessarily intended to represent a realistic 
mine plan, but rather that it was submitted to the agencies to establish a priority date for future water rights.  
Generally, earlier applications have priority over later applications for the same water (though there are exceptions).  
Some people think Northern Dynasty applied for water rights to help it in a future court battle with 
environmentalists, whom it believed would apply for rights to the same water. If the mining company’s application 
was primarily part of a legal strategy, that strategy would have required the company to apply for the maximum 
water it could conceivably justify. Then, a later application, based on a detailed project design, might have a water 
budget calling for less water. These sentiments are widely shared (including by this author), but have never been 
confirmed by any official of the company. 
21 On February 17, 2011, Northern Dynasty published another preliminary design for the proposed Pebble mine, 
with more detail than the 2006 conceptual design and proposing a different tailings location. Two weeks later, the 
CEO of Anglo American effectively distanced Anglo from Northern Dynasty’s new design. In an Anchorage 
speech, she said the Pebble Partnership “is still studying multiple options…and the Partnership does not have a 
preferred option,” and that the CEO of the partnership and his team would “engage in further consultation in 
advance of taking any proposal to permitting.” Cynthia Carroll, CEO Anglo American PLC, speech to Resource 
Development Council of Alaska, March 3, 2011. 
22 P. 2 
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The conservancy’s assessment directly addresses the question of using a design that might not be 
the basis for permitting: “Although this particular design may or may not form the basis of actual 
mine permitting in the future, this design does provide a conceivable scenario for how a large-
scale mine might be constructed and operated for this prospect, and thus is a suitable proxy for 
understanding the risks of such activity in these watersheds.”23  It goes on to say, “Although 
various details of a mine may change prior to final permitting, risks from various physical and 
chemical stressors are likely to be similar for any large-scale mine in this area.”24  
Is the Assessment Intended as Illustrative or Predictive? 
Because the conservancy’s study is a pre-design risk assessment, we need to address a question 
before moving into a detailed analysis: is the assessment intended as illustrative or predictive? 
Does it list risks that might occur? The assessment might simply be intended to illustrate 
potential risks that the public and permitting agencies should investigate during the permitting 
process—risks that a detailed mine design might (or might not) substantially minimize or 
eliminate. In that case, it could provide a list of issues to investigate during permitting. Or does 
the assessment attempt to predict what will occur—that even without a final mine design, the 
assessment is intended to specify the risks and the ecological consequences?  
There is at least some evidence in the assessment to support either conclusion about its purpose. 
The preface and introduction to the report indicate that it analyzes potential risks. For example, 
the assessment says it is “designed to analyze and portray the potential risks to globally 
significant salmon resources of the Nushagak-Mulchatna, and Kvichak river drainages (proximal 
headwater areas) as a result of large-scale mining and associated facilities.”25  In other places as 
well, the risks are discussed as “potential.”   
But elsewhere the risks are described as “inevitable,” and the assessment says, “Risks identified 
in this scenario [the scenario used for the risk assessment] and found to be associated with mines 
regardless of their design . . . apply to any large mine development in the region, whether it be at 
the Pebble prospect or any number of other mining claims currently identified and/or under 
exploration in the Nushagak and Kvichak watersheds (emphasis added).”26  
The author also attended a 2011 presentation about the risk assessment that the conservancy 
made to the Lake and Peninsula Borough Assembly.27 The presentation made it clear that the 
conservancy concludes the risks identified in the assessment—or very similar risks—are 
inevitable. Also, discussion at the assembly meeting turned to questions about how the 
assessment had influenced the conservancy’s decision to oppose the Pebble mine project. 
Representatives of the conservancy said that the level of risk outlined in the assessment was 
unacceptable and was an important reason the conservancy decided to oppose the project.28 
                                                 
23 Page 1 
24 Page 2 
25 Page 1. 
26 Preface. 
27 April 18, 2011 
28 Representatives of The Nature Conservancy handed out an undated resolution at the April 18, 2011 meeting of the 
Lake and Peninsula Borough Assembly, and said it had been passed by the conservancy’s board. It read, in part, 
“Whereas, for the last four years, the Conservancy has undertaken rigorous scientific investigation at a cost of 
roughly $2.5 million, including commission of several peer-reviewed independent reports [including the assessment 
that is analyzed here], to assess the potential risks to these resources caused by large-scale mining in these 
watersheds[;] Whereas, based on our understanding of the risks and the state of current, proven mining technology, 
large-scale mining in these critical watersheds at this time presents an inappropriate risk to the salmon systems of 
the region.”   
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Overall, then, the balance of evidence is that The Nature Conservancy believes the risks to 
salmon cited in its assessment are inevitable, as a result of the Pebble mine project or any other 
any large-scale mine developed in the Bristol Bay watershed. The remainder of this section 
examines five areas of risk addressed in The Nature Conservancy’s ecological risk analysis.  
 
Acid Rock Drainage 
There is a rich academic and government literature describing acid drainage from some mines, 
described as acid rock or acid mine drainage.29 The Nature Conservancy’s assessment 
summarizes some of that literature to demonstrate the common occurrence of the problem, 
especially at long-abandoned mines. There is a similarly rich literature on the effects of acid 
drainage on aquatic resources. As the assessment correctly summarizes, “Scientific literature is 
plentiful with studies that quantify the adverse environmental effects” of acid drainage on 
aquatic resources.30 
 
Having established that acid rock drainage can occur at mines and has serious adverse 
environmental consequences for streams, fish, and aquatic life, conservancy’s assessment turns 
to the next question: whether such acid drainage will occur at the proposed Pebble mine. 
 
The assessment begins by establishing that ore at the Pebble site is potentially acid generating. It 
summarizes a 2006 memo that reviewed the geochemical characterization of ore from 399 
samples, published by Northern Dynasty in 2005. The memo concludes that 95% of those 
samples have a ratio of acid-producing to acid-neutralizing minerals that indicates the ore is 
potentially acid generating. Pebble’s exploration database now numbers in the tens of thousands 
of samples, and staff at the Pebble mine have told government agencies that the additional 
samples support the conclusion that most of the ore in the Pebble deposit is potentially acid 
generating. Based on this information, it appears that if crushed and left exposed to oxygen and 
water, the ore would likely produce acid run-off.31 
 
The assessment also references two reports critical of the mining industry. Maest et al. (2005) 
concludes there is significant uncertainty in predicting future water quality from mines, and 
Kuipers et al. (2006) concludes that EIS predictions of acceptable water quality are often 
overstated. The Kuipers study finds a number of causes for those inaccurate predictions, 
                                                 
29 The term acid mine drainage (AMD) was first used to describe problems at coal mines in the United Kingdom.  
Many people now substitute the term acid rock drainage (ARD) to reflect the fact that the acid drainage can occur 
naturally, and that the problem can occur at other large-scale ground disturbances such as transportation or 
landscaping. There is a good discussion of the use of the two terms in Wikipedia 
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Acid_mine_drainage). From that website (on 9/13/11) “It is important to note that there 
is also a political subtext to this issue. Those who are favorable to mining tend to use the more generalized term 
ARD intending to diffuse away responsibility. In contrast, environmentalists and mining opponents often insist on 
AMD, wishing to strictly associate acid drainage with mining activity. In North America, common usage has shifted 
from AMD to ARD, except among environmentalists groups.”  The Nature Conservancy uses AMD in its 
assessment.  In this paper, the author uses ARD because he comes from a background as a regulator in which ARD 
was the common usage. The two terms are interchangeable with respect to this report.  
30 Page 54. 
31 The industry uses the terms Potentially Acid-Generating (PAG), and Not Potentially Acid Generating (Non-PAG) 
to describe the two ore types.  The word “potentially” in these terms recognizes that management techniques may be 
used to prevent acid generation from ore with high acid-generating potential.  Not all techniques work in all 
situations. However, there are numerous mines with PAG rock in their tailings that have prevented acid from 
forming, and others that have prevented acid from reaching the environment and harming downstream water quality. 
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including incomplete geochemical characterization and incomplete hydrologic information, and 
then concludes that proximity to a water source makes contamination more likely.  
 
Given this information, the conservancy’s assessment concludes: “…for the proposed mine, the 
understanding that the mine would be developed in an area with moderate precipitation (>36 
inches of precipitation per year), a high water table, numerous small streams, and over geological 
formations that are susceptible to groundwater movement, makes AMD [acid mine drainage] 
highly likely and a high risk proposition” and that “it is assumed that AMD will be formed at the 
proposed mine (emphasis added).”32 
 
It is important to understand the chain of logic in the assessment. It describes certain 
environmental characteristics that make preventing or containing acid formation more difficult: 
proximity to water, a high water table, and significant groundwater movement. It cites a study 
asserting that when Environmental Impact Statements predict mines won’t cause acid formation, 
those predictions are often overstated. Then, without evaluating whether any mitigation and 
prevention strategies would work in the locations described in the 2006 conceptual mine design, 
the assessment assumes acid drainage will form at a Pebble mine site.  
 
The assessment also assumes that the acid drainage will not be captured, and that it will be pH 4 
(highly acidic). Based on literature describing historic and long-abandoned mines, the 
assessment concludes that a Pebble mine would uncontrollably discharge pH 4 water. But the 
mines discussed in the assessment operated between 60 and 180 years ago, when there was no 
government environmental management or required mitigation.33   
 
Finally, the assessment assumes this contaminated flow would include all flows of water from 
the Pebble site. For the South Fork Koktuli River, these would amount to 7.2 cubic feet per 
second (cfs) during winter low flow and 114 cfs during May. For the North Fork Koktuli, the 
flow would be from 2.6 to 40.7 cfs. In other words, the risk assessment assumed large volumes 
of contaminated water would flow uncaptured from the site. It estimates “Instream pH levels 
from [acid mine drainage] below 5 could occur up to 30 miles from the mine. Low pH would 
result in fish kills and benthic community impacts.” 
 
To summarize, in the absence of a specific proposed mine location, a detailed mine plan with 
prevention and mitigation measures, and without investigating government requirements for 
dealing with acid formation, the risk assessment assumed catastrophic failure consistent with the 
failure from mines far in the past, at a time without environmental laws or management. 
 
Preventing or containing acid formation is one of the most important issues at any mine, and is a 
focus of both federal and state permits. The assessment’s conclusion that there would be 
significant uncaptured acid drainage from a Pebble mine is part of the basis for conclusions 
about ecological risks in other sections of the assessment. But there are a number of errors in the 
assessment’s means of reaching its conclusions, mostly because of assumptions analysts made in 
the absence of project-specific information.  
                                                 
32 P. 100. Also, as explained in footnote 29, the terms ARD and AMD have the same meaning in this report. 
33 According to the literature cited in their report, The Nature Conservancy made the assumption of pH 4 effluent 
after considering effects on Copper Brook Creek from the Phillips Mine, New York, abandoned approximately 1880 
(Gilchrest et al, 2006); Ore Hill Mine discovered 1834 and permanently closed 1915 (USFS 2009); Mount Perry 
Copper Mines Australia, mined approximately 1870s; an unspecified copper mine in Turkey (Mahiroglu et al 2009); 
and the Penn Mine in California, mined beginning 1861, abandoned 1953 (Bambic et al, 2006).  
  
   Page 25 
 
Error 1: Ore v. Tailings. Samples from the Pebble site confirm that most of the ore is potentially 
acid generating. But it isn’t unprocessed ore that is put into the environment. It is the tailings—
the leftovers after the ore has been processed and the valuable metals extracted—that go into the 
environment and can pose risks to land and water. Understanding the make-up of the tailings is 
important for predicting their environmental effects. The acid-generating potential of the ore is 
related to but is not the same as the acid-generating potential of the tailings. 
 
From presentations Pebble developers have made to government agencies, it appears they intend 
to use a milling process (floatation) to separate the heavy metals and sulfide from the remainder 
of the ore. If the company is successful, the milling process will generate concentrate (copper 
and other target minerals) and tailings. The presentations and the 2006 application indicate that 
the tailings themselves will be in two streams: “inert” (not-potentially acid generating) tailings 
making up 97% of the volume, and potentially acid-generating tailings making up 3%.   
 
Floatation is a common process, and in Alaska it is used at the Pogo, Greens Creek, Kensington, 
and Red Dog mines. Without the detailed test that would be evaluated during permitting for a 
Pebble mine, it is not possible to assess the extent to which the developers will succeed in 
eliminating acid-generating potential and heavy metals from the majority of the tailings. But 
without such data, it is also impossible to conclude that the company will fail. 
 
Also, there is a huge difference between providing conservative management to prevent billions 
of pounds of acid-generating tailings from leaching contaminated water into the environment and 
managing perhaps 3% of that amount, surrounded by non-acid generating tailings.  Proposed 
methods of protecting a small portion of tailings from affecting the environment are common 
components of mine designs. 
 
Error 2:  Focusing on Characteristics of a Site That Will Not be Used. The mine site 
conditions described in the assessment—“high water table, numerous small streams and over 
geologic formations that are susceptible to groundwater movement”— may exist at Site A, the 
larger of the two tailings locations included in Northern Dynasty’s 2006 applications. But they 
may not exist at other sites in the Pebble project area.  The developers have indicated they are no 
longer considering Site A for a tailings location. So the assessment’s conclusion that specific 
hydrologic characteristics make Site A inappropriate for tailings storage has little relevance; 
specific characteristics of sites that may be proposed in a future mine design submission are 
unknown right now. 
 
Error 3: Overgeneralization of Site Information.  The 2006 applications identified two potential 
tailing sites. There is no evidence that the potentially risky conditions described for Site A 
(above) exist at the second site, Site G, which appears to be a typical mountain valley. No 
available evidence suggests that Site G has unusual depth to bedrock, high water table, or high 
susceptibility to groundwater movement. In fact, the 2006 application provides some evidence 
for the opposite. The water rights applications request all water upstream of the tailing dams. For 
Site A, groundwater would be approximately one quarter of the total water, but only 1/340 of the 
total for Site G.34 This relatively small amount of groundwater in the Site G application indicates 
that the conditions described for Site A don’t exist at Site G. 
                                                 
34 The Site A request is for 51 cubic feet/second (cfs), of which 12 cfs is groundwater.  Site G request is for 34 cfs, 
of which only 0.1 cfs is groundwater.  
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Error 4: Departure from the Literature. Even if the location ultimately proposed for the mine 
were to have the environmental conditions described for Site A—including high water table and 
formations susceptible to groundwater movement—the literature on acid rock drainage does not 
preclude locating a mine in those conditions. The literature does recommend careful and 
complete geochemical analysis, baseline water quality, and multiple back-up mitigation to ensure 
that acid-generation or significant metals leaching is avoided, and if it occurs, is caught before it 
affects water quality. It might be more difficult to locate a mine in these conditions, and high 
standards, extensive baseline information, and extensive testing and monitoring would be 
appropriate. Without much more information than is currently available, it is not possible to 
conclude that a mine design would succeed in a location with conditions similar to those at the 
2006 proposed Site A. But without knowing how the mine’s waste would be managed and 
without the necessary supporting data, it’s also not possible to conclude it would fail. The 
conclusion that environmental conditions like those at Site A would inevitably lead to acid 
drainage does not have a basis cited in the literature. 
 
Error 5: Omission of Prevention and Mitigation Techniques.  The conservancy’s assessment 
gives no consideration to mine design or government-mandated prevention and mitigation 
requirements. There are numerous techniques designed to keep potentially acid-generating 
tailings sequestered from oxygen (which prevents the acid from forming) and mitigation 
techniques that prevent acid that has formed from reaching the environment.  For example, the 
Pogo and Greens Creek mines separate tailings by their acid-generating potential, encase a 
portion of the tailings in a cement mixture, and put these tailings underground (to prevent acid 
formation). The Kensington mine ships most heavy metals and sulfide minerals off-site. The 
Pogo, Greens Creek, and Kensington mines are underground, and these techniques would likely 
be unavailable to an open-pit operation such as that proposed for the Pebble site. But the point is, 
there are risk prevention techniques to prevent acid formation, and mitigation techniques to 
prevent any acid from leaving the site. Until the Pebble developers propose a design and there is 
appropriate data to evaluate that design, it is not possible to draw conclusions about their ability 
to prevent acid rock drainage from forming, or reaching the environment if it does form.35 But 
the issue government agencies discuss most during permitting for mines is the potential for acid-
mine drainage (and metals leaching). The assessment’s conclusion that acid-generating ore 
would turn into acid-generating tailings and be generally distributed, without significant 
management, is unwarranted.Such a mine could not be legally permitted. 
 
Error 6: Level of Uncertainty. The conservancy’s assessment also addresses the question of the 
uncertainty of its conclusions. It concludes, “Based on historical information from other hard 
rock mines, there is a high certainty that [acid mine drainage] will develop during the life of the 
mine and affect downstream water bodies.” The language in which the assessment gives itself a 
high degree of certainty is technically restricted to acid-formation itself, not the volumes or the 
uncontrolled release. But readers are likely to infer that this level of certainty applies to the 
overall issue—formation, volume, and uncontrolled release of acid drainage. It is difficult to find 
any justification for that certainty, given the analytical errors discussed above. 
 
                                                 
35 Still, it is surprising that the assessment ignores the proposed prevention strategy—tailings separation—included 
in the 2006 application: dividing tailings into 97% inert and 3% potentially acid generating. Without the detailed 
testing and design information missing from the 2006 applications, it is not possible to estimate the success (or 
failure) of this technique. 
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Water Withdrawal 
In 2006, Northern Dynasty applied for the right to use all the water in the mine area it was 
considering at the time. That included surface and groundwater within portions of the South Fork 
of the Koktuli drainage, a tributary of the North Fork Koktuli River, and Upper Talarik Creek.36 
The Nature Conservancy’s assessment takes the water volume requested in the applications and 
traces the effects on salmon habitat of losing that amount of water. Those effects include direct 
loss of habitat at the mine site, and decreased flow and changes in substrate, velocity, 
temperature, and other measures downstream.  
 
This paper does not evaluate the impact methodology the Nature Conservancy used to trace the 
effects on habitat, flow, or environmental parameters of losing that volume of water. Instead, it 
evaluates the assumptions used in the assessment. 
 
Alaska statutes require a government authorization before a company or individual uses water, 
but that definition includes diversions. Alaska Statute AS 46.15.180(a)(1) provides that “A 
person may not construct works for an appropriation, or divert, impound, withdraw or use a 
significant amount a water without a permit…” If a mine uses water and then returns it to the 
stream, the mining company still needs a permit or water right. If the company diverts a stream 
without changing the flow or timing, or pumps water from groundwater and then lets it flow onto 
the surface, the company needs a permit or water right, even though the quantity of water 
available in the stream may remain unchanged.  
 
The fact that a company holds a water right does not necessarily mean that there is less water for 
downstream users. Some water uses do sequester water and make less available downstream.  A 
mine may apply for rights to a water volume that includes both types of uses together—some that 
decrease the flow available downstream, and some that do not.  
 
So it is not to possible to determine how much water will be available downstream from only the 
total number in the water rights application, and it is difficult to predict impacts without knowing 
how much water would be available for downstream uses. Faced with this lack of information, 
the conservancy’s analysts assumed that all the water in the application would be forever 
sequestered from the environment and so not available for downstream uses.37  
 
                                                 
36 Actually, there were nine applications.  Three initial applications, one for each drainage, that included all surface 
and groundwater within the area of the mine and tailings facilities, a second set of three that provided some 
additional information requested by the state, and then a final set of three applications that identified only the 
groundwater component included in the previous applications.  
37 In fairness, the 2006 water right applications do say that “At this time no return flow or discharge of water is 
anticipated during construction or operations.”  But that sentence is somewhat balanced by a similar sentence, noting 
that the company was considering “options for compensating for the water appropriated.” (One such option might 
be, for example, putting water back into the stream). Finally, the applications make clear that not all of the three 
sources would be used at the same time, something not referenced in the conservancy’s assessment. The 
conservancy analysts could have contacted Pebble staff to find out more about what the 2006 applications mean, but 
they didn’t (and it is unknown whether Pebble staff would have cooperated, if they had).  
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The author completed three tasks to determine whether that assumption was reasonable: 
1) Contacted staff at the Pebble project to ask whether all the water in the 2006 applications 
would be withdrawn from downstream uses. 
 
2) Reviewed the 2006 applications to determine if they are consistent with the assumption 
that all the water would be sequestered. 
 
3) Compared the water volumes in Northern Dynasty’s 2006 application with water use at 
the Fort Knox and Red Dog mines. 
 
Contact with Pebble Staff.  When contacted by the author, Pebble scientists indicated that 
approximately one-half to one-third of the total amounts in the 2006 application would likely be 
unavailable for downstream uses.38 
 
Water Use in the Application. In a mine, the major water uses that sequester water from 
downstream uses are evaporation, water retained in tailings/waste rock, and water retained in 
concentrate. With minor exceptions, all other water uses recycle water—that is, some water is 
required at start-up, but then the water is used again and again without requiring more. Other 
water is “used up” during the process and requires replacement. Of such uses, the water retained 
in the tailings voids is by far the largest use. 
 
That’s true in Northern Dynasty’s 2006 water rights application: the largest water use category is 
water retained in tailings and waste rock voids. However, the 2006 application also included 
another surprisingly large category: water in the tailings pond.   
 
At mines with tailings ponds, water on the surface of the pond is recycled for use in the mill.  
During milling, tailings are discharged into the tailings pond. As the tailings settle out, some 
water remains on the surface, and some water is permanently sequestered in the tailings voids.  
The water that remains on the surface is taken back into the mill, and the process repeats. The 
volume of water in the tailings pond may increase marginally as the pond grows to cover a larger 
tailings area (or it may not, depending on the geometry of the tailings and other factors). 
However, it is the loss of water in the tailings void that requires adding fresh make-up water 
from outside the mine. 
 
The 2006 application includes a large volume for use in the tailings pond itself. The applications 
forecast 33,700 acre-feet/year for tailings Site A, and 25,000 acre-feet/year for tailings Site G.39 
The diagrams in the application indicate the ultimate surface area of the water in the tailings lake 
at Site A would be approximately 3,000 acres. At that acreage, if 33,700 acre-feet of water were 
added to the pond each year, after 20 years the water in the tailings pond would be 225 feet 
                                                 
38 Ken Taylor and Mike Smith, PLP, personal communications, various dates. This estimate does not include water 
for power generation at the site, which may or may not be proposed and was not included in the 2006 application. 
This potential for on-site power generation only increases the uncertainty about water use. 
39 These numbers are taken from Table 2, Water in the TSF supernatant pond, in the 9/21/06 Surface Water 
Completeness Applications.  It assumes from the applications that the Talarik Creek and South Fork water is used 
for Tailings Site A, and that Talarik Creek and North Fork water is used for Tailings Site G.  
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deep.40  This is an unrealistic result; 20 feet deep would be more typical.  Even accounting for 
evaporation of 1.2 feet/year,41 or for water lost with the concentrate export, the depth of 225 feet 
is unrealistic. The calculation for Site G produces a similar depth—230 feet.  
These author’s estimates—water more than 10 times deeper than usual in a tailings pond—mean 
that the mine would be very unlikely to sequester the total amount of water requested in the 2006 
application. So it is also not likely that, as the assessment assumed, all that water would be 
unavailable for downstream uses. 
 
 Comparison with Fort Knox and Red Dog Mines. Water use in a mine is, in part, proportional 
to the volume of tailings. A number of other factors also affect a mine’s water use. For that 
reason, it’s not possible to directly calculate one mine’s water needs by comparing it with use at 
other mines. But comparing the water use per ton of ore implied in the 2006 Northern Dynasty 
applications with use at the two other open-pit mines in Alaska may be a partial check on 
reliability of the volumes cited in the applications. When The Nature Conservancy analysts 
assumed that all the water in the applications would be used, they implicitly assumed that the 
project would use between 165 and 210 gallons/ton of ore.42 The Fort Knox Project water 
Resources Management Plan (1994) indicated that Fort Knox would use 90 to 110 gallons/ton, 
depending on the processing scenario.43  The Red Dog Mine’s actual use from 1999-2004 was 
101 gallons/ton.44  Mines are all different, and there is no standard for water use/ton, but the 
difference between the conservancy’s assumptions about water use at the Pebble site, and use at 
the two open-pit mines operating in Alaska, gives confidence to the conclusion that not all of the 
water in the 2006 applications would be unavailable for downstream uses. 
 
Uncertainty. The three methods of checking described above show that assuming (as the 
conservancy’s assessment does) none of the water requested in the 2006 applications would be 
returned to the stream is likely wrong. There is considerable question as to how much of the 
water in the 2006 application would be available for downstream uses, and even more 
uncertainty about whether that application will be representative of the final mine application.   
                                                 
40 The applications do not include enough detail even to calculate this number with any confidence.  The application 
indicates that Site G would be designed to include 2 billion tons of tailings (Facilities Description in Support of a 
Water Rights Application, South Fork Koktuli River application 7/2006, page 3).  Footnote 3 under Table 2 of the 
9/21/06 Completeness Response indicates a deposition rate of 90 million tons per year, giving a deposition life for 
the site of 22 years. Thus, 33,700 acre-feet/yr times 20 years divided by 3,000 acres gives approximately 225 depth 
to the tailings lake. The same citation and calculations (only for the North Fork Koktuli applications) for Site A 
gives an approximate 230-foot depth.  
41 Hydrometeorology Report June 19, 2006, page 4.  Submitted with the 2006 Northern Dynasty Surface Water 
Rights applications.  The report indicates 14 inches of lake evaporation annually at the site.  
42 Calculation is as follows.  For Site A: 90 million tons/year ÷ (Total of South Fork Koktuli + Upper Talarik Creek 
water use [51 + 29 cfs = 80 cfs]).  After required unit adjustments, water use comes to 210 gallons/ton.  For Site G: 
similar calculations except using total of North Fork Koktuli + Upper Talarik Creek (34 + 29 cfs = 63 cfs).  After 
required unit adjustments, water use equals 165 gallons/ton. 
43 Fort Knox Project Water Resources Management Plan, prepared by Fairbanks Gold Mining, Inc., March 1994, 
Figure 3-1 and 3-2.  Two scenarios involve 36,000 T/day. The first requires 2750 gallons per minute in make-up 
water; the second, 2245 gallons per minute. With appropriate unit changes these volumes equal 90 and 110 
gallons/ton. 
44 Water use from Geometrix Memo of 12/14/2006, Summary of Red Dog Water Balance. That memo indicated that 
between 1999 and 2004, water use averaged 159 Mgal/yr for water entrained in tailings, 31 Mgal/yr for water in the 
concentrate, and 95 Mgal for evaporation. For a total of 285 Mgal/yr.  Production for those years averaged 3.1 
million tonnes per year (Paul Glavinovich, NANA; e-mail communication 10/4/11).  After appropriate unit 
conversions, this amount equals 101 gallons/ton. 
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As part of the mine design, the project must set out a water budget—a document that will answer 
questions about the volume of water to be withdrawn from creeks or groundwater, how the water 
will be used, and what volume will be available for downstream uses. 
A water budget is one of the most important documents a mine produces. It is influenced by the 
mining rate, tailings grind, and many other mine-design details.  Agencies scrutinize water 
budgets during the permit process. A budget typically goes through many iterations before the 
mine developer has confidence in it and before the agencies are willing to accept it.  Until a 
water budget is final, and until the Department of Natural Resources proposes a water right 
volume, how much water the mine will need is unknown. Therefore, there is a lot of uncertainty 
about the impacts to downstream fish populations, until the water budget process is complete. 
But the conservancy’s assessment concludes, “Based on the details of the 2006 water use permit 
applications, there is very little uncertainty associated with the analysis of loss and reduction in 
stream flow in watersheds near the proposed mine.” This conclusion misses the major 
uncertainty in the analysis: once the analysts made assumptions about the water use requested in 
the application, and also assumed the applications will be indicative of the final mine 
applications, then little uncertainty remains in their results.  But there is very large uncertainty in 
their assumptions.  
 
Culvert Impacts 
The Nature Conservancy’s risk assessment reports that a road approximately 80 miles long from 
a Pebble mine site to a potential port site on Cook Inlet would cross 89 drainages, 14 of which 
are officially designated as supporting salmon. These fourteen streams are the largest the road 
would cross. The salmon value of the remaining 75 smaller streams is unknown. They may or 
may not be anadromous salmon habitat. The assessment says that 35 miles of habitat is upstream 
of the 14 known salmon drainages, and could be stranded by non-functional culverts. 45   
After documenting the resources at risk, the assessment references a wide variety of academic 
and agency literature to demonstrate the high percentages of culverts that are installed incorrectly 
or fail after installation. One such study analyzed Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
information about the Copper River watershed and concluded that 57% of culverts of a 244 
sample were not passable to fish and that another 28% might not be passable.46  The assessment 
quotes other studies that indicate up to 83% of culverts evaluated in various locations were 
inadequate for fish passage.  
Based on this evidence, the assessment concludes that “risks to salmon populations from culvert 
placement during road construction for the mine are reasonably likely over the long term” and 
that “this would virtually eliminate, or substantially reduce upper portions of these small streams 
(for example, Chokok Creek, Pile River, Canyon Creek, Eagle Bay Creek, and most unnamed 
creeks) ”47. From the discussion that the vast majority of culverts are improperly placed or 
maintained, and with no discussion of prevention or mitigation measures, the assessment implies 
the likelihood that salmon would be cut off from tens of miles of anadromous habitat. 
The assessment also examines the uncertainty of these conclusions about habitat loss and 
concludes, “Although information on culvert types expected for stream crossings is unknown, 
                                                 
45 On page 43 and 45, the assessment notes that there are 75 miles of anadromous waters upstream of the culvert 
locations in the 14 identified salmon streams.  On page 108, the assessment lists and explains that there are 35 miles 
of anadromous waters upstream.  
46 Copper River Knowledge System (CRKS), 2009.  
47 P. 46 
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the uncertainty associated with effects to salmon movement from placements is low. Information 
from Alaska and other states which showed that culverts have historically resulted in impacts to 
salmon was used to reduce the uncertainty of impacts predicted from the source.”48   
Overall, the assessment concludes it is “reasonably certain” that the road would eliminate 
significant mileage of anadromous salmon resources, and that the uncertainty associated with 
that prediction is “low.” But there are a number of errors in the assessment’s analysis. 
Error 1: Bridges v. Culverts. The conservancy’s assessment effectively establishes that culvert 
problems are common and can cut off upstream salmon habitat. But it fails to take into account 
that bridges rather than culverts would likely be used to cross many of the streams and rivers 
along the road. Bridges have fewer impacts and fewer problems than culverts.   
The picture in Figure 5 shows an example of the error in assuming all crossings would use 
culverts. The assessment includes the Iliamna River in its list of 14 stream crossings that could 
cut off salmon habitat. At the crossing location shown on the Pebble developer’s public maps, 
the river is 155 feet wide. There is already a bridge over that river, and it seems clear that any 
new crossing would also use a bridge.  
Figure 5. Proposed Iliamna River Crossing Location: 155 Feet Wide  
 
 
The Alaska Department of Fish and Game regulates crossings of streams with anadromous or 
resident fish.  The department analyzes each crossing before applying specific requirements, but 
current department guidelines indicate that stream crossings wider than 20 feet generally use 
bridges, not culverts.49 In some cases, companies use bridges for narrower streams, and less 
                                                 
48 P. 131 
49 Robert MacLean, personal communication.  August 2011. 
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frequently they use culverts for wider streams. Every named stream in the conservancy’s 
assessment, other than Eagle Creek, is wider than 20 feet: Chokok Creek, Canyon Creek, 
Knutson Creek, Pile River, Iliamna River, and Newhalen River.50  For example, Newhalen River 
is approximately 400 feet wide, and Knutson Creek is approximately 140 feet wide. These 
waterways would likely be crossed with bridges, not culverts. Many of the unnamed creeks 
might also warrant bridges. Therefore, the assessment’s assertion that crossings have the 
potential to “virtually eliminate” the anadromous habitat in Chokok Creek, Pile River, Canyon 
Creek, and Eagle Bay Creek, is almost certainly incorrect. 
The literature summarized in the assessment—even the Alaska literature—appears to evaluate 
culverts installed during various times, but mostly years ago. These “legacy” culverts can be 
expected to have more problems that those installed to modern standards, under current 
permitting requirements. Today, every culvert in a stream with habitat for resident or 
anadromous fish requires a permit from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, consistent 
with modern standards. Presumably, the department’s permitting standards significantly decrease 
the incidence of poor installation or culvert failure.  
Still, even though a number of streams along a road from the Pebble mine site would require 
bridge crossings, many small streams would be crossed with culverts. Some of those will 
inevitably include salmon or resident fish habitat—and it is quite likely that some culverts will 
be improperly installed or will subsequently fail.  
 
Error 2:  Failure to Consider Typical Prevention and Mitigation Strategies and Experience 
from Other Alaska Mine Roads.  It is entirely possible to construct stream crossings that avoid 
significant effects on streams, even using culverts. That requires both good design and 
prevention and mitigation strategies, including: 
• Design (Preventing problems). Design all stream crossings to Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game standards. 
• Construction (Preventing problems). Construct stream crossings to standards required in 
permits. 
• Inspection (Mitigation). Inspect periodically to ensure that crossings are constructed to 
standards and to identify post-construction problems. Post-construction problems could 
include erosion from floods, frost jacking, and plugging by beavers: even well-installed 
culverts do not work forever without maintenance. 
• Repair (Mitigation). Fix whatever problems are identified by inspection. 
 
In Alaska, only the first step or two are routinely accomplished. The Department of Fish and 
Game might issue permits for most stream crossings in Alaska, but it lacks the funds to 
periodically inspect every culvert. Furthermore, when the department or others identify a 
problem culvert, a responsible party may no longer exist to fix the problem—or the responsible 
party may be a government agency that requires an appropriation to do the repairs. The 
department works with government agencies to get repairs when they can work it into their 
federal funds request or receive an appropriation.  The department does not typically demand an 
immediate fix, whatever the financial consequences, though it is allowed to do so under the law.  
The lack of inspection and repair may be one reason why failed culverts remain in place.  
 
                                                 
50 Approximate creek widths are as follows:  Chekok Creek: 25 feet; Canyon Creek: 30 feet; Newhalen River: 400 
feet; Eagle Bay Creek: 12 to 15 feet; Knutson Creek: 140 feet; Pile River: 135feet; Iliamna River: 155 feet. 
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That’s the general situation with culvert maintenance. But long, large-mine access roads tend to 
be different. Alaska has 126 miles of such roads with culverts and bridges: 
• Red Dog mine road (Delong Mountain Transportation System), 52 miles 
• Pogo mine road, 49 miles 
• Greens Creek mine road, 13 miles 
• Fort Knox/True North, 12 miles 
Unlike most projects in Alaska, mining projects are frequently inspected by the Alaska 
departments of Natural Resources, Environmental Conservation, and Fish and Game. In addition, 
the agency inspections are not subject to government funding whims, because in most cases the 
agency can charge the mine for the inspection. Thus, unlike on other roads in Alaska, the stream 
crossings along mine roads are inspected at least annually and sometimes more frequently.  
Problem crossings can be identified quickly. 
Another difference is that mine roads (and culverts) have owners—the mining companies—with 
money and a legally enforceable responsibility to fix problems. Alaska’s large mine operators 
have historically fixed problem stream crossings when inspections identify problems. Further, 
the state’s authorizations for Alaska’s large mines have included a requirement for third-party 
audits of the agencies and the mines. These audits identify problems at the sites and should have 
identified culvert issues that have not been adequately addressed.   
For example, the Greens Creek Mine 2009 Third-Party Mine Audit inspected random culverts 
and found no problems (page D-7). The Pogo Mine 2009 Audit included inspection of the major 
road stream crossings (page 17).  The Department of Fish and Game reports that culvert 
problems have been found in audits and that the companies repaired them in a timely way. 
Anecdotal evidence from employees of that department and others indicates that culvert 
problems exist but are not common.51  The frequency of reported problems is far below the 
figures cited in the conservancy’s assessment—likely because of much greater and continuing 
oversight by the Department of Fish and Game.  
Overall, analyzing only culvert installations without also analyzing likely mitigation and 
prevention strategies overstates the risk of ecological impacts.52 
Comparison with other reports.  As another way of analyzing the conservancy’s assessment of 
the risks posed by culverts along mine roads, the author checked to see if other analyses not 
associated with the Pebble mine controversy reached similar conclusions. Those include the Red 
Dog Mine Extension EIS (2009), the Pogo Gold Mine Project EIS (2003), and third-party audits 
for the Pogo and Greens Creek mines. Some of these have the advantage that the roads actually 
existed at the time of the analysis, and so didn’t require scientific speculation about the impacts. 
• According to the Red Dog EIS, the 52-mile mine access road “includes nine bridges, 
three major culvert crossings, and 455 minor culvert crossings (page 3-275).” While 
many or most of those culverts may cross streams without anadromous fish habitat, it is 
                                                 
51 Robert MacLean, personal communication, August 2011. 
52 The conservancy’s assessment indirectly acknowledges the problem of omitting prevention and mitigation 
strategies, noting “This analysis was based on historical data on habitat effects resulting from road crossings in 
general and does not reflect the proposed mine’s specific construction techniques or mitigation efforts. With 
consideration of the possible effects to fisheries from road and culvert crossings, mine developers may reduce or 
eliminate potential impacts discussed in this assessment to reasonable levels (p. 43).” This caveatthat the mine 
could greatly reduce culvert risk  is not carried over to the assessment’s conclusions about risk to salmon habitat.  
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noteworthy that issues associated with failed culverts were not identified as significant in 
the scoping document, public or agency comments, or the EIS. 
  
• The 2003 Pogo Gold Mine Project EIS evaluated the 49-mile road to that mine. The 
portion that discusses road crossings concludes, “While construction activities and 
operation would affect some erosion and sedimentation even under BMPs [best 
management practices], the overall impacts on fish and aquatic habitat would be low and 
localized” (page 4-99).  No significant effects on fisheries as a result of culvert failure are 
identified. 
 
• Finally, the author’s review of third-party audits of the Fort Knox, Pogo, and Greens 
Creek mines found that some specifically addressed potential culvert issues, but none 
identified failed culverts as an important issue.  
  
Overall, a significant incidence of culvert failure along mine roads does not appear to have been 
an issue with government agencies, including the Department of Fish and Game. 
 
Uncertainty Analysis.  Concerning uncertainly in its analysis of likely culvert problems along a 
Pebble mine access road, the conservancy’s assessment concludes, “Although information on 
culvert types expected for stream crossings is unknown, the uncertainty associated with effects to 
salmon movements from culverts placement is low. Information from Alaska and other states 
which showed that culverts have historically resulted in impacts to salmon was used to reduce 
the uncertainty of impacts predicted from this source.” 
 
The statement that uncertainty is low on impacts to salmon habitat from culvert placement avoids 
the sources of uncertainty.53  Culvert placement is only one part of the system that affects 
ecological risk. Ecological risk is reduced by systematic and frequent inspection and repair.  
Uncertainty in the assessment’s conclusion is introduced by (1) not acknowledging that wider 
rivers would be crossed by bridges, not culverts; (2) not discussing the extent to which modern 
design requirements reduce the incidence of problems associated with older culverts; and (3) not 
considering typical inspection and repair regimes (prevention and mitigation strategies) used for 
other hard-rock mine roads in Alaska. Since we cannot know to what extent these prevention and 
mitigation strategies would be required if the Pebble mine were developed, there may be a much 
greater uncertainty in the assessment’s conclusions than it acknowledges. 
 
Overall, the examination of the conservancy’s analysis of culvert failure provides a good 
example of the errors that can be introduced by omitting prevention and mitigation measures in 
an ecological risk assessment. 
 
Fugitive Dust 
The Nature Conservancy had little site- or project-specific data from the Pebble area with which 
to predict the potential amount and consequence of fugitive dust from a mine in that area.  
Instead, the assessment uses studies from the Red Dog mine in northwest Alaska to estimate the 
distribution of dust, the concentration of metals in the dust, and the amount of metal that would 
reach local streams from a Pebble mine site. It uses a series of scientific models to predict 
                                                 
53 The assessment is correct in that if large number of culverts were placed, some might fail in construction or over 
time and could cause at least temporary effects. But the potential for “at least temporary effects” is not the 
conclusion of the assessment. It clearly implies significant loss of upstream habitat, for a significant length of time.  
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potential metal concentrations in sediment. Because site-specific data for a potential Pebble mine 
are not yet available, those models are based on assumptions generated in other studies and 
mines. Using the predicted metal concentrations in the fugitive dust (based on Red Dog mine 
data), the assessment predicts metal concentrations in stream sediments (using various 
assumptions), and metal concentrations in stream water.  
Overall, the assessment concludes that even with mitigation measures at the mine, fugitive dust 
would result in continuous and long-term metal contamination of surface waters near the Pebble 
project. Specifically, it says, “The models predict that, without treatment measures, dust 
generated at the mine would result in medal-laden soils, with transport mechanisms resulting in 
continuous, long-term contamination of local surface waters that support multiple salmon life 
stages. Although the preceding discussions may present an overly simplistic approach to 
evaluating impacts from dust generated by the proposed mine, a certainty exists that, even with 
mitigation measures employed at the mine, copper and other metals will likely be mobilized in 
runoff or leached into surface and/or groundwater over the 40-70 year life of the mine. The 
actual amount may be higher or lower than predicted, but the current ambient metal 
concentrations in surface waters within the watershed indicate that any increase in dissolved 
metals’ fractions could result in negative effects to the most sensitive salmon life stages.”54 
A number of errors affect the conservancy’s assessment of the fugitive-dust effects. 
Error: Selective Use of Red Dog Information.  The Red Dog lead-zinc mine in northwest 
Alaska is a very high-grade mine. The ore deposit has a grade of 21% zinc and 6 % lead.55  The 
Pebble deposit, by comparison, has a copper grade of 0.42%.56 As many in the industry put it: 
The waste rock at Red Dog has higher grade than the ore at most mines.57 In part because that 
very high grade results in a high concentration of metal in the dust, fugitive dust at Red Dog has 
been extensively studied. 
The conservancy’s assessment makes extensive use of some of this information for the Red Dog 
mine—for example, to estimate distance for dust deposition and to predict the rate at which 
metals will concentrate in the soil at a Pebble mine site.  But it does not make use of any of the 
studies—such as the fugitive dust risk assessment described in Section 4 of this paper—that have 
looked at whether this dust has in fact contaminated the fish, benthic environment, or water at 
and around the Red Dog mine.  
This omission seems odd, given the extensive and recent publications on the subject, and the fact 
that Red Dog has much higher metals concentrations in the dust than would occur at a Pebble 
site. Those higher concentrations would make it much easier to detect dust-induced changes in 
water quality at Red Dog—but the studies cited below don’t report such changes. 
 
• Red Dog Mine Road Fugitive Dust Risk Assessment.  Section 4 of this paper described the 
2007 DMTS Fugitive Dust Risk Assessment. That study did not conclude that fugitive 
dust had contaminated water quality near the road or mine.58   
                                                 
54 P. 84 
55 Red Dog Mine Closure and Reclamation Plan; Supporting Document B, Plan of Operations; 2009, p. 1 
56 Pebble Partnership Press Release, February 1, 2010. 
57 For example, the waste rock at Red Dog has a lead concentration of 1.2% (Teck Comico, 2005.  Summary of 
Mine Related Fugitive Dust Studies, p.3).  The ore at Pebble has a concentration of 0.42% copper (ibid). 
58 The study focused on the road; two decades of travel by uncovered ore trucks had caused a local deposition of 
high concentrations of metals along the roadway. (The trucks are now covered). The Red Dog concentrate has a 
metals concentration hundreds of time greater than the dust concentration at a Pebble mine is likely to be—so the 
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• Red Dog EIS.  The Red Dog Supplemental EIS (2009) discusses fugitive dust but 
primarily with respect to its effects along the Red Dog road. This extensively reviewed 
document did not identify fugitive dust’s effects on water quality, other than from the 
road, as an issue for analysis—even though the concentration of metal in the dust around 
that mine is many times greater than what the conservancy’s assessment predicts for a 
Pebble mine site. The EIS does include water-quality evaluations of streams, including 
those around the mine site—but they do no show exceedances of lead or zinc, as would 
be expected using the conservancy’s predictive models. 
Errors in Red Dog Assumptions. The conservancy’s analysts corrected for the difference in 
metal concentrations at the Red Dog and Pebble sites by using the ratio of concentration of 
metals in the ore. They used the lead concentration, which they cited as ~4.8% (elsewhere cited 
as close to 6%)59 to Pebble’s copper concentration of ~0.6%. That ratio is 8, so the analysts 
adjusted the Red Dog values for the Pebble site by multiplying by ⅛ (0.125). However, under 
that logic, they could just have easily made the adjustment using the Red Dog’s zinc 
concentration of roughly 21%, rather than the lead concentration. Using the zinc concentration, 
the analysts would have multiplied Red Dog values by 0.03% instead of 0.125%. That reduction 
would have changed the assessment’s conclusions about potential contamination by dust.  
Also, the conservancy’s analysts used the difference in wind speed at the two sites—the average 
wind speed at Pebble is 60% that at Red Dog—to correct the distance the dust would travel, but 
not the amount of dust that the wind would collect. The different wind speed could affect both.  
The largest potential error in the assessment is not accounting for differences in dust sources at 
Red Dog and Pebble sites. The table shows potential dust sources and metal concentrations at 











                                                                                                                                                             
metals concentration in the area of deposition will be hundreds of times higher than at any locations likely to be 
affected by dust from a Pebble mine. On the other hand, the deposition from Red Dog is concentrated in a smaller 
area—near the road rather than throughout the watershed. But the question of dust-carried metal concentrations 
much higher than would likely occur in Pebble or other Alaska mines is relevant to the discussion.   
59 The difference between the conservancy’s citation that indicates a lead concentration of 4.8%, and the citation in 
this report that indicates almost 6% does not indicate any significant problem.  The two citations may reflect the 
condition of the ore body at different dates, or include different level of reserves, etc. 
60 Summary of Mine Related Dust Studies.  Red Dog Mine Site.  Teck Cominco, March 14, 2005. Table 1, p. 3. 
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Figure 6 shows an aerial photograph of the Red Dog Mine in 2003. The labeled areas show the 
approximate locations of the major mine features: the pit, the waste rock, and the exposed 
tailings. The mine facilities are visible but not circled. There are a number of important dust 
sources at Red Dog that might not contribute to dust or metal concentrations at a Pebble mine 
site. Specifically, waste rock is a major dust source at Red Dog; it is large, prominent, and 
elevated above the surrounding landscape, and it has a significant concentration of metals (1.2% 
of lead and zinc). It is likely a significant source of dust and dust with metal concentrations. At 
Pebble, the 2006 applications indicate that the potentially acid-generating waste rock would be 
placed under water, eliminating the dust potential.61 
Figure 6. Red Dog Mine 2003 
 
 
Also, a very large source of contaminated dust is the concentrate itself. That source has received 
the most attention at Red Dog. The concentrate source of fugitive dust was the uncovered haul 
trucks (now covered), and incidental dusting of the haul trucks during loading (Red Dog now 
uses an indoor truck wash to minimize this source). While concentrate dust may not be a large 
component of the overall fugitive dust volume, it is a significant source of the metals in the dust, 
because it is approximately 50 times more concentrated than in the waste or tailings.  The 
problem of fugitive dust from concentrate is unlikely to be relevant at Pebble.  The 
conservancy’s assessment discusses a concentrate pipeline, which would not create fugitive. 
 
The Red Dog studies have not quantified the contribution of each fugitive dust source.  
Nevertheless, the waste rock stockpile and the concentrate are likely to be a large portion of the 
quantity of dust and of the metal content in the fugitive dust. Neither is likely to be relevant at a 
Pebble mine site.  Therefore, the predictions in the conservancy’s assessment, which implicitly 
                                                 
61 It is likely that the potentially acid-generating waste rock is also the waste rock that has metal content. The tertiary 
sediment that comprises the non-potentially acid-generating waste rock that the 2006 application indicates would not 
be placed under water is not likely to have significant metal content—though without more information, that 
conclusion can’t be confirmed.   
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include these sources, would be a significant over-estimate of the dust amount and metals 
concentration at a Pebble mine. 
 
Error: Failure to Include Prevention/Mitigation Measures in Place at Red Dog.  The 
conservancy’s assessment predicts copper content in fugitive dust from a Pebble site based on 
the growth in metal concentrations at Red Dog from 1989 to 2004. It takes the metal 
concentrations in the soil for those two dates and does a straight-line interpolation to determine 
the annual growth in metal concentration. However, a dust study at Red Dog notes that between 
those two dates, “Improvements have been made that have eliminated or greatly reduced some 
particulate sources.”62  In fact, between 1991 and 2004, the Red Dog operator implemented 23 
improvements—some extensive—to decrease the amount of fugitive dust from the mine.63  
 
Presumably, those improvements did reduce the dust, and therefore the annual amount of 
fugitive dust from the mine would have decreased significantly between 1989 and 2004. So a 
straight-line interpolation to determine the annual growth would significantly over-estimate the 
current rate of growth metal concentrations in soil at Red Dog. If the annual growth is over-
estimated for Red Dog, it would also be over-estimated for the Pebble site, since that is based on 
the Red Dog information.  This conclusion assumes that at least some of the prevention and 
mitigation measures in place at Red Dog would also be implemented at a Pebble mine. 
 
Error: Failures to Include Prevention/Mitigation Measures or Site-Specific Characteristics at 
Pebble.  Many measures can be implemented at a mine to decrease the amount of fugitive dust. 
As indicated above, Red Dog implemented 23 measures to control dust over 13 years.  The 
conservancy’s assessment indicates this omission, noting “the analysis does not consider possible 
dust control best management practices (BMP) such as those that have recently occurred at Red 
Dog Mine.”64  Taking into account significant measures to control dust would change the 




Northern Dynasty’s 2006 water rights applications were accompanied by applications for tailings 
dams that would hold large volumes: two billion tons of tailings at Site A and 450 million tons at 
Site G. The proposed dams themselves would be extremely large; the largest proposed dam at 
Site A was 740 feet and the largest at Site G 450 feet. Obviously, if such large dams failed, the 
consequences could be extremely severe, depending on the type and extent of failure. 
 
The Nature Conservancy’s assessment included a long list of failures at tailings dams around the 
world. An appendix cites 88 such failures between 1961 and 2009 and references an even larger 
number—147 failures worldwide—but doesn’t specify a time period. The assessment describes 
many examples of such failures and their consequences. Some of the dams should never have 
been built—and some never would have been built in the U.S.  But some of the failures did occur 
in developed places, including the U.S., Scandinavia, and Western Europe. 
 
                                                 
62 Summary of Mine Related Dust Studies, Red Dog Mine.  Teck Cominco Alaska. March 14, 2005, p.2.  
63 ibid, Appendix II.  One of the 23 improvements was later abandoned. 
64 P. 67 
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The conservancy’s assessment does not predict the likelihood of a dam failure at a Pebble mine 
site. It may not be possible to predict the likelihood of such a low-probability event: despite the 
documented tailings dam failures, such failures are not common.   
 
But it would have been helpful if the assessment had included a discussion of the different 
construction methods and techniques (prevention/mitigation) that minimize the likelihood of 
failure, and that result in stronger and more stable tailings dams. From the literature review in the 
assessment, it would appear that the literature is unable to quantify the extent to which certain 
techniques decrease the incidence or consequence of dam failures.  But author’s conversations 
with experts make it clear that some construction methods are safer than others: downstream 
versus upstream construction; rock core versus unsorted gravity dams; foundations that extend to 
bedrock versus those that do not, and others. Without that discussion, the assessment leaves 
readers with the incorrect impression that dam failure is solely a statistical event—that dams 
sometimes just fail, and there are limited ways to prevent failures or prepare for them. 
 
After the discussion of dam failures, the assessment mostly describes the environmental effects 
of a catastrophic failure. In general it concludes that “A failure of one of the tailings dams 
planned for the proposed mine would have both short and long term impacts on receiving waters, 
with severity depending on dam release volume, timing, and location.”65  This author agrees with 
that conclusion.  But while the general conclusion is accurate, some of the more specific 
predictions of impact in the body of the report are predicated on questionable assumptions. 
 
Error: Chemical Assumptions.  The assessment assumes that the water in the tailings pond 
would be acidic, with dissolved copper and other metals in solution. There is no analysis to 
justify this assumption; it is just asserted. In fact, as reported earlier, Northern Dynasty’s 2006 
water rights and dam safety applications indicated that the tailings would be separated into 
potentially acid-generating tailings (3%) and the much greater volume of non-potentially acid-
generating tailings (97%). The technique proposed in the applications would be placing the 
potentially acid-generating tailings lower in the tailings stack; in that situation, the overlying 
water in the tailings pond would have no contact with potentially acid-generating tailings. While 
there is not enough data or design information to evaluate Northern Dynasty’s assertion that it 
could separate the potentially acid-generating tailings, the conservancy’s assessment simply 
ignores it.  Instead it makes the unsupported assertion that the water on top of the tailings would 
be acidic, with the associated high levels of dissolved metals. Data required for permitting will 
specifically address the question of acidity and water quality in the tailings lake—but it is not 
possible to predict tailings water quality with the limited project-specific data in the 2006 
applications.66  
 
Other Information and Run-Out Distances.  The conservancy’s assessment uses an empirical 
relationship from a journal article to assert there is a good chance that a significant tailings dam 
break would result in tailings reaching down the Koktuli River to Bristol Bay itself.  The 
assessment includes some but not all of the caveats from the journal’s authors and tends to 
convey an overly optimistic view of the reliability of its conclusions. 
 
                                                 
65 p. 90 
66 The author’s familiarity with tailings water in Alaska indicates that such water may not meet water quality 
standards. But that does not mean that the waters will be acidic or have the high concentration of metals that the 
conservancy’s assessment assumes, or that the water would be toxic to aquatic life. 
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The journal article uses regression equations from a data set of 28 mostly tailings dam failures to 
statistically predict downstream run-out, based on dam height and the volume of tailings released 
in the failure.67  While regression equations based on general characteristics of a dam provide an 
interesting first approach for assessing downstream vulnerabilities, they are not a substitute for 
detailed analysis based on project- and site-specific data. The assessment quotes from the article: 
 
The diversity of the tailings dam characteristics (dam type, dam situation, dam 
foundation, storage volume, etc.) make any universal prediction assessing failure impacts 
very speculative.  In addition, detailed risk assessments involve timely and costly 
geotechnical, hydrologic and hydraulic studies which can only be completed with the 
complicity of either or both the mining companies and political authorities.68 
 
The article goes on to say, “It is evident that the results need to be treated with caution, due to the 
uncertainty present in documentary evidence and the diversity of the tailings dams.”69   
 
In addition to the “speculative” and “first assessment” nature of predictions using the journal’s 
methodologies, the conservancy’s assessment uses the equations far beyond the range of the data 
set. The 28 failed dams used in the analysis had an average height of 79 feet and a standard 
deviation of approximately 46 feet; the dams ranged from 16 feet to 216 feet high. The dams 
proposed in Northern Dynasty’s 2006 water rights applications would be much higher. Site A 
includes dams up to 740 feet high, and the largest dam at Site G was proposed to be 450 feet 
high.  
 
While it is logical to expect that downstream run-out distance would increase with dam height, 
the specific relationship might not be valid.  The height proposed for a dam at Site A is 14 
standard deviations away from the data-set mean height. It is almost 3½ times the maximum 
height of the tallest dam in the data set, and more than 5 times the height of the second tallest 
dam. The small data set and the large extrapolation beyond it provide some reason to question 
the validity of the empirical relationship of those values.  
 
There is also theoretical reason to question the application of the equations to dams of this 
height. The equation requires an estimate of the proportion of tailings that would escape during a 
dam failure. But tailings dams are different from water retention dams. Unlike water, compacted 
tailings have some structural value. As the journal article notes, “In most failures, tailings ponds 
are never emptied and, indeed, only a limited portion of the mine waste is released.”70  Different 
types of dam failures may release tailings differently.  However, for many types of failures, the 
water stored with the tailings is important to mobilizing the tailings into and increasing a breach 
from a failing dam. The greater the volume of mobile water relative to tailings behind the dam, 
the greater the volume of tailings that will likely escape in the event of failure.  
 
 
                                                 
67 The relevant equation from the article is: Dmax = 1.61 x (HVF)0.66  r2 = 0.57.  The maximum runout distance (Dmax) 
in Km is equal to 1.61 times the product of dam height (H in meters) and the volume of tailings that released (VF in 
million cubic meters) raised to the power of 0.66. Rico et al, p. 82.  
68 Rico et al., p. 85 
69 Ibid, p. 86 
70 Ibid, pp. 80-81. 
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In the data set used to estimate the equation the conservancy assessment uses, the proportion of 
stored tailings released in a failure varied from 2% to 80%, with an average of 35%.  But the 
proportion of mobile water content in the tailings, and the ability to mobilize tailings during a 
dam breach, would likely decrease as dam height increases. That is, as the tailings compact under 
the weight of hundreds of feet of tailings, the lower elevation tailings store much less free water 
than those at the top of the pile.  That difference could easily affect the relationship in the 
equation, especially as applied to a dam height 14 standard deviations beyond that of the data 
set.71   
 
Some construction and management regimes are likely to minimize the mobile water in the 
tailings. Some designs store great amounts of mobile water.  These prevention and mitigation 
techniques cannot be included in a “preliminary” or “speculative” series of equations. They can 
be considered in a site-specific analysis of data and designs that would be available during a 
permitting phase for any Pebble mine.  
 
This uncertainty is compounded because the conservancy’s assessment considers only failures 
that release a proportion of tailings near the average or greater, but not less. In the data set used 
by the journal authors, the dam failures released an average of 35% of the stored tailings. So 
analysts might be expected to choose the mean, and some reasonable deviations around the 
mean. The assessment did not do that, but instead chose 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% tailings 
release. Since only one of the data points in the journal article was significantly more than 50%, 
the assessment’s choice of data likely conveys an overestimate of the scale of catastrophe in the 
event of dam breach at the Pebble site. 
 
Without a site-specific, detailed analysis of the features of the proposed dams (which are 
unknown at present), the extent of downstream impacts can’t be reliably predicted. The journal 
article acknowledges that, as does the body of the conservancy’s assessment. But the assessment 
fails to acknowledge the level of uncertainty in its conclusions.72 
 
                                                 
71 The journal article did investigate whether the volume of tailings released in a dam failure was related to dam 
height.  It found that the best predictor to use was the average—that the proportion released did not decrease with 
dam height. However, that lack of relationship may be been due to the small data set, and the variability in dam 
failure type and dam designs, as well as the fact that the data did not give the authors the ability to control for 
volume of mobile water.  For some type of designs and failure mode, it is likely that the volume of mobile water 
does affect tailings mobility in the event of a breach. 
72 While the conservancy’s assessment acknowledges these limits, it justifies ignoring them because of the large 
size of the proposed Pebble dams, and by what appears to be an inappropriate comparison with the Los Frailes dam 
failure in Spain, which was caused by foundation failure. That specific failure mechanism may have influenced the 
proportion of tailings that spilled and the run-out distance. Foundation failure is one of the least likely causes of dam 
failure when engineered facilities are keyed into bedrock. For that reason, it may not be an apt comparison.  
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Summary: Why Assessment Conclusions Not Supportable 
The Nature Conservancy’s ecological risk assessment comes to scientifically unsupportable 
conclusions about the risks of mining to Bristol Bay salmon. It does so because the lack of data 
meant the analysts had to make assumptions that don’t necessarily reflect what a mine at the 
Pebble site would look like; the developers haven’t yet submitted a design. That problem is 
compounded because the analysis also omits prevention and mitigation strategies that the mine 
developers might propose or the government will require; again, such strategies can’t be known, 
in the absence of a mine design. The next two pages summarize how the lack of project- and site-
specific data affects the results of the assessment. 
 
Use of an Unrealistic Base Case 
For each of the subjects we just discussed, the conservancy’s analysts lacked the information to 
construct a realistic base case, and therefore made unjustifiable assumptions.  
• Acid Rock Drainage.  The analysts lacked project- and site-specific information they 
needed to understand whether the tailings would be acid-generating, and whether any 
acid-drainage that formed would escape from the mine’s containment system. Instead, 
they assumed that acid-mine drainage would form and escape the mine site in a volume 
and acidity characteristic of abandoned mines from decades and centuries ago. There is 
no justification for this assumption.  
• Water Withdrawal. The analysts lacked information to assess how much of the water 
Northern Dynasty applied for in its 2006 water rights applications would be unavailable 
for downstream uses. Therefore, they assumed none of it would be available and 
predicted risk to salmon habitat on that basis. That assumption isn’t justifiable; until a 
water budget is final, and until the Department of Natural Resources proposes a water 
right volume, how much water a mine will need is unknown. 
• Culvert Failure.  The analysts did not know which streams along a road from the 
proposed mine would be crossed with bridges and which with culverts. The discussion in 
the assessment did acknowledge the potential for using bridges at some crossings, but all 
the tables and conclusions in the assessment assumed that all waterways would be 
crossed with culverts. In fact, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game’s guidelines for 
the bridge/culvert decision indicate that crossings wider than 20 feet typically require 
bridges; major crossings that are named in the assessment would therefore almost 
certainly use bridges, which have fewer impacts and fewer problems than culverts. 
• Fugitive Dust. The analysts drew conclusions about the risk from fugitive dust at the 
Pebble mine site using Red Dog mine data, and concluded fugitive dust would 
contaminate surface waters near the Pebble project. This paper documents errors they 
made in their analysis, the most important being that they did not review available data 
on whether fugitive dust from Red Dog mine has affected water quality in nearby streams 
and lakes. Since the concentration of metals in dust from Red Dog is higher than it is 
likely to be in dust from the Pebble deposit, Red Dog dust would be more likely to create 
water quality problems—but as discussed earlier, studies to date haven’t found evidence 
of dust-induced changes in water quality as a result of dust from Red Dog.  
• Dam Failure.  The analysts did not try to predict the likelihood of dam failure at a Pebble 
mine site. But should a dam fail, they predicted a catastrophic base case using regression 
equations of questionable applicability. 
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Omitting Prevention and Mitigation Strategies 
For each of the five subjects discussed earlier, the analysts assessed the ecological risks without 
including prevention and mitigation strategies that could reduce those risks. In most cases, they 
couldn’t do so: at the pre-design stage specific prevention and mitigation strategies are unknown. 
The developer has not yet proposed them, and government agencies have not considered what 
they will require.  The problem with the omissions are summarized below.  
 
• Acid Rock Drainage. The analysts did not consider the prevention strategy Northern 
Dynasty referred to in its 2006 applications—separating the potentially acid-generating 
from the non-acid generating the tailings, and sequestering the potentially acid-generating 
tailings from oxygen and the environment. Nor did they consider the possibility of any 
other method to prevent contamination, of monitoring by the government or company, or 
of a back-up containment in the case those methods didn’t work. But there is no site-
specific data to assess whether such measures would work to protect salmon or not, and 
no data to assess whether and how much they would decrease the ecological risk.  
 
• Water Withdrawal.  Northern Dynasty’s 2006 applications made a vague reference to 
strategies that might mitigate the effects of withdrawing water from the ecosystem, but 
there was not enough information to include any such strategy in the conservancy’s 
assessment. 
 
• Culvert Failure.  There are standard prevention and mitigation strategies used to prevent 
culvert failure and limit the consequences when they do fail: design standards, 
construction to design, inspection, and repair. The conservancy’s assessment omitted any 
discussion of these measures, even though they are known, and even though Alaska has 
129 miles of mine roads from large mines with which to assess whether they work.  
Consideration of the results of the 129 miles of existing roads shows that the conclusions 
of the conservancy’s assessment are significantly overstated. Because culverts have 
standard prevention and mitigation strategies, this section shows the consequences of 
omitting such strategies on the assessment of ecological risk 
 
• Fugitive Dust.  The assessment’s predictions about the effects of fugitive dust were based 
on data from the Red Dog mine, but it did not include any discussion about the 
improvements the Red Dog operator has made to reduce fugitive dust—or how such 
measures might help at a Pebble mine.  
 
• Dam Failure.  Not all dams are alike. Some construction techniques result in stronger 
and more stable dams; some may limit tailings escape even in some breach modes. The 
pre-design assessment wasn’t able to evaluate such potential prevention and mitigation 
techniques, because the Pebble developer has not yet submitted designs for dams. 
 
A pre-design ecological risk assessment might have been able to discuss more potential 
prevention and mitigation strategies for a Pebble mine, if such strategies were not so site-
specific. But hard-rock mines are all different from one another. Challenges posed by the 
geochemical make-up of the ore, and by the environment, are different in different locations.  
These differences can occur in locations close to one another. And different mines come up with 
different solutions to the issues each location presents. Omitting these strategies results in an 
analysis that likely exaggerates the risk to salmon. In fact, agencies could not legally permit 
some of the risks portrayed in the conservancy’s assessment.  
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Section 6. Conclusion 
Scientifically sound ecological risk assessments require a great deal of data.  The assessments of 
the Kensington mine’s proposed disposal of tailings, and the effects of fugitive dust along the 
Red Dog mine road, are extremely detailed, as discussed in Section 4. These post-design 
assessments used information from testing specific project parameters (bench-scale testing of 
Kensington tailings) or of actual sampling (metal concentrations along the Red Dog Road).   
Analysts used data (bathymetry of Lower Slate Lake) only available when the specific mine site 
was known. They gathered data (metals bioaccumulation in benthic organisms on Kensington 
tailings; sampling plant tissue along the Red Dog Road) specific to the projects. Having these 
project-specific details and knowing the environmental characteristics of the specific sites 
allowed analysts to draw scientifically supportable conclusions in these assessments. 
By contrast, the pre-design assessment methodology The Nature Conservancy used to evaluate 
the ecological risks of large-scale mining to Bristol Bay salmon is based, in the absence of site- 
and project-specific data, on various assumptions about what would happen. This paper has 
shown that many assumptions were unjustified and resulted in unsupportable conclusions that 
most likely exaggerated the ecological risks.  
Every hard-rock mine in Alaska is unique. They each use different methods to protect water 
quality and fish populations. The geochemical characteristics of ore and tailings also differ for 
every mine in Alaska. Some mines have different ore characteristics within the same ore body, or 
within nearby ore bodies. Milling processes are engineered for individual mines.   
And each mine site is different. In fact, even the two tailings sites proposed in Northern 
Dynasty’s 2006 applications—and reviewed in the conservancy’s assessment—differ 
significantly. Site G is a mountain valley with little groundwater flow, and Site A is within an 
open valley with significant groundwater volume. From the applications, it appears that the 
developer expected about one-quarter of the water captured at Site A to be groundwater, while at 
at Site G groundwater was expected to be only 1/340 of the volume.  This is a very significant 
difference. The Pebble developers have said they are no longer considering the conceptual mine 
design submitted in 2006—so the tailings site ultimately proposed for a mine could be 
significantly different from either of these.  Such differences influence the ecological risk. 
The variability among mines is why mine permitting is such a data-intensive process. Without 
data from individual mine design and site configurations, government agencies cannot determine 
whether mines meet permitting standards. It takes a large amount of environmental baseline and 
mine design information for the agencies to evaluate whether to issue permits for hard-rock 
mines, and it takes a large amount of data for agencies to prepare an EIS to illustrate the 
environmental consequences of a proposal. Those processes are very much like those used in an 
assessment of ecological risk. In fact, formal ecological risk assessments are often part of the 
permitting/EIS process.  It is unlikely that a pre-design ecological risk assessment could provide 
as quantifiable answers as an EIS with much less data. 
This comparison of post- and pre-design risk assessment in this report shows that the detailed 
information, about a specific site and a specific mine design, and without specific knowing the 
specific prevention and mitigation strategies that will be applied, it is not possible to use 
ecological risk assessment methodology to evaluate the risks a proposed mine might pose to the 
environment.  Specifically, a pre-design ecological risk assessment is a failed methodology for 
evaluating ecological risks from hard-rock mines in Alaska. 
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